Device authentication and User+Device authentication

Cristian Novac Cristian.Novac at alcatel-lucent.ro
Tue Jul 29 09:54:14 CEST 2008


Cristian Novac wrote:
> CURRENT CONDITIONS:
> I'm  currently using FreeRadius server in a system where the server is 
> authenticating to the client using a server certificate.
> For now, the client is authenticating through username and password.
> The method used is EAP-TTLS.
> -----------------------
> THE TARGET is the client to not only use username and password, but a 
> device CERTIFICATE.
> -----------------------
> I assume that I have to include in the etc/raddb/eap.conf file the 
> LIST OF DEVICE ROOT CERTIFICATES.
> If so, can you tell me how to do that?
> Otherwise, may you tell me what other things I have to do?
>

Could someone just tell whether my assumption is wright?

> I attached my current eap.conf file
>
> Thank you!
> Cristian NOVAC.
>
>
> Alan DeKok wrote:
>> Cristian Novac wrote:
>>  
>>> Could someone tell me what has to be configured to be able to do Device
>>> authentication and User+Device authentication.
>>>     
>>
>>   It all depends how you plan on authenticating the devices and users.
>> i.e. Which authentication protocols are you using?
>>
>>   Then.... configure the authentication protocols.
>>
>>   Alan DeKok.
>> -
>> List info/subscribe/unsubscribe? See 
>> http://www.freeradius.org/list/users.html
>>   
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> # -*- text -*-
> #
> #  Whatever you do, do NOT set 'Auth-Type := EAP'.  The server
> #  is smart enough to figure this out on its own.  The most
> #  common side effect of setting 'Auth-Type := EAP' is that the
> #  users then cannot use ANY other authentication method.
> #
> #	$Id: eap.conf,v 1.4.4.1 2006/01/04 14:29:29 nbk Exp $
> #
> 	eap {
> 		#  Invoke the default supported EAP type when
> 		#  EAP-Identity response is received.
> 		#
> 		#  The incoming EAP messages DO NOT specify which EAP
> 		#  type they will be using, so it MUST be set here.
> 		#
> 		#  For now, only one default EAP type may be used at a time.
> 		#
> 		#  If the EAP-Type attribute is set by another module,
> 		#  then that EAP type takes precedence over the
> 		#  default type configured here.
> 		#
> 		default_eap_type = ttls
>
> 		#  A list is maintained to correlate EAP-Response
> 		#  packets with EAP-Request packets.  After a
> 		#  configurable length of time, entries in the list
> 		#  expire, and are deleted.
> 		#
> 		timer_expire     = 60
>
> 		#  There are many EAP types, but the server has support
> 		#  for only a limited subset.  If the server receives
> 		#  a request for an EAP type it does not support, then
> 		#  it normally rejects the request.  By setting this
> 		#  configuration to "yes", you can tell the server to
> 		#  instead keep processing the request.  Another module
> 		#  MUST then be configured to proxy the request to
> 		#  another RADIUS server which supports that EAP type.
> 		#
> 		#  If another module is NOT configured to handle the
> 		#  request, then the request will still end up being
> 		#  rejected.
> 		ignore_unknown_eap_types = no
>
> 		# Cisco AP1230B firmware 12.2(13)JA1 has a bug.  When given
> 		# a User-Name attribute in an Access-Accept, it copies one
> 		# more byte than it should.
> 		#
> 		# We can work around it by configurably adding an extra
> 		# zero byte.
> 		cisco_accounting_username_bug = no
>
> 		# Supported EAP-types
> 		
> 		
> 		#
> 		#  We do NOT recommend using EAP-MD5 authentication
> 		#  for wireless connections.  It is insecure, and does
> 		#  not provide for dynamic WEP keys.
> 		#
> 		md5 {
> 		}
>
> 		# Cisco LEAP
> 		#
> 		#  We do not recommend using LEAP in new deployments.  See:
> 		#  http://www.securiteam.com/tools/5TP012ACKE.html
> 		#
> 		#  Cisco LEAP uses the MS-CHAP algorithm (but not
> 		#  the MS-CHAP attributes) to perform it's authentication.
> 		#
> 		#  As a result, LEAP *requires* access to the plain-text
> 		#  User-Password, or the NT-Password attributes.
> 		#  'System' authentication is impossible with LEAP.
> 		#
> #		leap {
> #		}
>
> 		#  Generic Token Card.
> 		#
> 		#  Currently, this is only permitted inside of EAP-TTLS,
> 		#  or EAP-PEAP.  The module "challenges" the user with
> 		#  text, and the response from the user is taken to be
> 		#  the User-Password.
> 		#
> 		#  Proxying the tunneled EAP-GTC session is a bad idea,
> 		#  the users password will go over the wire in plain-text,
> 		#  for anyone to see.
> 		#
> #		gtc {
> 			#  The default challenge, which many clients
> 			#  ignore..
> 			#challenge = "Password: "
>
> 			#  The plain-text response which comes back
> 			#  is put into a User-Password attribute,
> 			#  and passed to another module for
> 			#  authentication.  This allows the EAP-GTC
> 			#  response to be checked against plain-text,
> 			#  or crypt'd passwords.
> 			#
> 			#  If you say "Local" instead of "PAP", then
> 			#  the module will look for a User-Password
> 			#  configured for the request, and do the
> 			#  authentication itself.
> 			#
> #			auth_type = PAP
> #		}
>
> 		## EAP-TLS
> 		#
> 		#  To generate ctest certificates, run the script
> 		#
> 		#	../scripts/certs.sh
> 		#
> 		#  The documents on http://www.freeradius.org/doc
> 		#  are old, but may be helpful.
> 		#
> 		#  See also:
> 		#
> 		#  http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,9286052~mode=flat
> 		#
> 		tls {
> #			private_key_password = whatever
> 			private_key_password = asb#1234
> #			private_key_file = ${raddbdir}/certs/cert-srv.pem
> 			private_key_file = ${raddbdir}/certs/NEW/server-key.pem
>
> 			#  If Private key & Certificate are located in
> 			#  the same file, then private_key_file &
> 			#  certificate_file must contain the same file
> 			#  name.
> #			certificate_file = ${raddbdir}/certs/cert-srv.pem
> 			certificate_file = ${raddbdir}/certs/NEW/server.pem
>
> 			#  Trusted Root CA list
> #			CA_file = ${raddbdir}/certs/demoCA/cacert.pem
> 			CA_file = ${raddbdir}/certs/NEW/ca-cert.pem
>
> 			dh_file = ${raddbdir}/certs/NEW/dh
> 			random_file = ${raddbdir}/certs/NEW/random
>
> 			#
> 			#  This can never exceed the size of a RADIUS
> 			#  packet (4096 bytes), and is preferably half
> 			#  that, to accomodate other attributes in
> 			#  RADIUS packet.  On most APs the MAX packet
> 			#  length is configured between 1500 - 1600
> 			#  In these cases, fragment size should be
> 			#  1024 or less.
> 			#
> 			fragment_size = 1024
>
> 			#  include_length is a flag which is
> 			#  by default set to yes If set to
> 			#  yes, Total Length of the message is
> 			#  included in EVERY packet we send.
> 			#  If set to no, Total Length of the
> 			#  message is included ONLY in the
> 			#  First packet of a fragment series.
> 			#
> 			include_length = yes
>
> 			#  Check the Certificate Revocation List
> 			#
> 			#  1) Copy CA certificates and CRLs to same directory.
> 			#  2) Execute 'c_rehash <CA certs&CRLs Directory>'.
> 			#    'c_rehash' is OpenSSL's command.
> 			#  3) Add 'CA_path=<CA certs&CRLs directory>'
> 			#      to radiusd.conf's tls section.
> 			#  4) uncomment the line below.
> 			#  5) Restart radiusd
> 			check_crl = yes
>
> 		       #
> 		       #  If check_cert_cn is set, the value will
> 		       #  be xlat'ed and checked against the CN
> 		       #  in the client certificate.  If the values
> 		       #  do not match, the certificate verification
> 		       #  will fail rejecting the user.
> 		       #
> 		#	check_cert_cn = %{User-Name}
> 		}
>
> 		#  The TTLS module implements the EAP-TTLS protocol,
> 		#  which can be described as EAP inside of Diameter,
> 		#  inside of TLS, inside of EAP, inside of RADIUS...
> 		#
> 		#  Surprisingly, it works quite well.
> 		#
> 		#  The TTLS module needs the TLS module to be installed
> 		#  and configured, in order to use the TLS tunnel
> 		#  inside of the EAP packet.  You will still need to
> 		#  configure the TLS module, even if you do not want
> 		#  to deploy EAP-TLS in your network.  Users will not
> 		#  be able to request EAP-TLS, as it requires them to
> 		#  have a client certificate.  EAP-TTLS does not
> 		#  require a client certificate.
> 		#
> 		
> 			
> 		ttls {
> 			#  The tunneled EAP session needs a default
> 			#  EAP type which is separate from the one for
> 			#  the non-tunneled EAP module.  Inside of the
> 			#  TTLS tunnel, we recommend using EAP-MD5.
> 			#  If the request does not contain an EAP
> 			#  conversation, then this configuration entry
> 			#  is ignored.
> 			default_eap_type = mschapv2
> #			default_eap_type = md5
>
> 			#  The tunneled authentication request does
> 			#  not usually contain useful attributes
> 			#  like 'Calling-Station-Id', etc.  These
> 			#  attributes are outside of the tunnel,
> 			#  and normally unavailable to the tunneled
> 			#  authentication request.
> 			#
> 			#  By setting this configuration entry to
> 			#  'yes', any attribute which NOT in the
> 			#  tunneled authentication request, but
> 			#  which IS available outside of the tunnel,
> 			#  is copied to the tunneled request.
> 			#
> 			# allowed values: {no, yes}
> 			copy_request_to_tunnel = yes
>
> 			#  The reply attributes sent to the NAS are
> 			#  usually based on the name of the user
> 			#  'outside' of the tunnel (usually
> 			#  'anonymous').  If you want to send the
> 			#  reply attributes based on the user name
> 			#  inside of the tunnel, then set this
> 			#  configuration entry to 'yes', and the reply
> 			#  to the NAS will be taken from the reply to
> 			#  the tunneled request.
> 			#
> 			# allowed values: {no, yes}
> 			use_tunneled_reply = yes
> 		}
>
> 	        sim {
> 		}
> 		#
> 		#  The tunneled EAP session needs a default EAP type
> 		#  which is separate from the one for the non-tunneled
> 		#  EAP module.  Inside of the TLS/PEAP tunnel, we
> 		#  recommend using EAP-MS-CHAPv2.
> 		#
> 		#  The PEAP module needs the TLS module to be installed
> 		#  and configured, in order to use the TLS tunnel
> 		#  inside of the EAP packet.  You will still need to
> 		#  configure the TLS module, even if you do not want
> 		#  to deploy EAP-TLS in your network.  Users will not
> 		#  be able to request EAP-TLS, as it requires them to
> 		#  have a client certificate.  EAP-PEAP does not
> 		#  require a client certificate.
> 		#
> 		# peap {
> 			#  The tunneled EAP session needs a default
> 			#  EAP type which is separate from the one for
> 			#  the non-tunneled EAP module.  Inside of the
> 			#  PEAP tunnel, we recommend using MS-CHAPv2,
> 			#  as that is the default type supported by
> 			#  Windows clients.
> 		#	default_eap_type = mschapv2
>
> 			#  the PEAP module also has these configuration
> 			#  items, which are the same as for TTLS.
> 		#	copy_request_to_tunnel = no
> 		#	use_tunneled_reply = no
>
> 			#  When the tunneled session is proxied, the
> 			#  home server may not understand EAP-MSCHAP-V2.
> 			#  Set this entry to "no" to proxy the tunneled
> 			#  EAP-MSCHAP-V2 as normal MSCHAPv2.
> 		#	proxy_tunneled_request_as_eap = yes
> 		#}
>
> 		#
> 		#  This takes no configuration.
> 		#
> 		#  Note that it is the EAP MS-CHAPv2 sub-module, not
> 		#  the main 'mschap' module.
> 		#
> 		#  Note also that in order for this sub-module to work,
> 		#  the main 'mschap' module MUST ALSO be configured.
> 		#
> 		#  This module is the *Microsoft* implementation of MS-CHAPv2
> 		#  in EAP.  There is another (incompatible) implementation
> 		#  of MS-CHAPv2 in EAP by Cisco, which FreeRADIUS does not
> 		#  currently support.
> 		#
> 		mschapv2 {
> 		}
> 	}
>
>   




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