/* * tls.c * * Version: $Id: 9df48b4c445e94fe2cb9465191d1195ee7df4e19 $ * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or * (at your option) any later version. * * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the * GNU General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA * * Copyright 2001 hereUare Communications, Inc. * Copyright 2003 Alan DeKok * Copyright 2006 The FreeRADIUS server project */ RCSID("$Id: 9df48b4c445e94fe2cb9465191d1195ee7df4e19 $") USES_APPLE_DEPRECATED_API /* OpenSSL API has been deprecated by Apple */ #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTIME_H #include #endif #include #ifdef WITH_TLS # ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_RAND_H # include # endif # ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H # include # endif # ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_H # include # endif # include #define LOG_PREFIX "tls" #ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_VERSION_CHECK typedef struct libssl_defect { uint64_t high; uint64_t low; char const *id; char const *name; char const *comment; } libssl_defect_t; /* Record critical defects in libssl here (newest first)*/ static libssl_defect_t libssl_defects[] = { { .low = 0x010001000, /* 1.0.1 */ .high = 0x01000106f, /* 1.0.1f */ .id = "CVE-2014-0160", .name = "Heartbleed", .comment = "For more information see http://heartbleed.com" } }; #endif /* ENABLE_OPENSSL_VERSION_CHECK */ FR_NAME_NUMBER const fr_tls_status_table[] = { { "invalid", FR_TLS_INVALID }, { "request", FR_TLS_REQUEST }, { "response", FR_TLS_RESPONSE }, { "success", FR_TLS_SUCCESS }, { "fail", FR_TLS_FAIL }, { "noop", FR_TLS_NOOP }, { "start", FR_TLS_START }, { "ok", FR_TLS_OK }, { "ack", FR_TLS_ACK }, { "first fragment", FR_TLS_FIRST_FRAGMENT }, { "more fragments", FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS }, { "length included", FR_TLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED }, { "more fragments with length", FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS_WITH_LENGTH }, { "handled", FR_TLS_HANDLED }, { NULL , -1}, }; /* index we use to store cached session VPs * needs to be dynamic so we can supply a "free" function */ int fr_tls_ex_index_vps = -1; int fr_tls_ex_index_certs = -1; /* Session */ static void session_close(tls_session_t *ssn); static void session_init(tls_session_t *ssn); /* record */ static void record_init(record_t *buf); static void record_close(record_t *buf); static unsigned int record_plus(record_t *buf, void const *ptr, unsigned int size); static unsigned int record_minus(record_t *buf, void *ptr, unsigned int size); #ifdef PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN static bool identity_is_safe(const char *identity) { char c; if (!identity) return true; while ((c = *(identity++)) != '\0') { if (isalpha((int) c) || isdigit((int) c) || isspace((int) c) || (c == '@') || (c == '-') || (c == '_') || (c == '.')) { continue; } return false; } return true; } /* * When a client uses TLS-PSK to talk to a server, this callback * is used by the server to determine the PSK to use. */ static unsigned int psk_server_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len) { unsigned int psk_len = 0; fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf; REQUEST *request; conf = (fr_tls_server_conf_t *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF); if (!conf) return 0; request = (REQUEST *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_REQUEST); if (request && conf->psk_query) { size_t hex_len; VALUE_PAIR *vp; char buffer[2 * PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN + 4]; /* allow for too-long keys */ /* * The passed identity is weird. Deny it. */ if (!identity_is_safe(identity)) { RWDEBUG("Invalid characters in PSK identity %s", identity); return 0; } vp = pairmake_packet("TLS-PSK-Identity", identity, T_OP_SET); if (!vp) return 0; hex_len = radius_xlat(buffer, sizeof(buffer), request, conf->psk_query, NULL, NULL); if (!hex_len) { RWDEBUG("PSK expansion returned an empty string."); return 0; } /* * The returned key is truncated at MORE than * OpenSSL can handle. That way we can detect * the truncation, and complain about it. */ if (hex_len > (2 * max_psk_len)) { RWDEBUG("Returned PSK is too long (%u > %u)", (unsigned int) hex_len, 2 * max_psk_len); return 0; } /* * Leave the TLS-PSK-Identity in the request, and * convert the expansion from printable string * back to hex. */ return fr_hex2bin(psk, max_psk_len, buffer, hex_len); } if (!conf->psk_identity) { DEBUG("No static PSK identity set. Rejecting the user"); return 0; } /* * No REQUEST, or no dynamic query. Just look for a * static identity. */ if (strcmp(identity, conf->psk_identity) != 0) { ERROR("Supplied PSK identity %s does not match configuration. Rejecting.", identity); return 0; } psk_len = strlen(conf->psk_password); if (psk_len > (2 * max_psk_len)) return 0; return fr_hex2bin(psk, max_psk_len, conf->psk_password, psk_len); } static unsigned int psk_client_callback(SSL *ssl, UNUSED char const *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len) { unsigned int psk_len; fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf; conf = (fr_tls_server_conf_t *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF); if (!conf) return 0; psk_len = strlen(conf->psk_password); if (psk_len > (2 * max_psk_len)) return 0; strlcpy(identity, conf->psk_identity, max_identity_len); return fr_hex2bin(psk, max_psk_len, conf->psk_password, psk_len); } #endif static int _tls_session_free(tls_session_t *ssn) { /* * Free any opaque TTLS or PEAP data. */ if ((ssn->opaque) && (ssn->free_opaque)) { ssn->free_opaque(ssn->opaque); ssn->opaque = NULL; } session_close(ssn); return 0; } tls_session_t *tls_new_client_session(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf, int fd) { int verify_mode; tls_session_t *ssn = NULL; REQUEST *request; ssn = talloc_zero(ctx, tls_session_t); if (!ssn) return NULL; talloc_set_destructor(ssn, _tls_session_free); ssn->ctx = conf->ctx; SSL_CTX_set_mode(ssn->ctx, SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER | SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY); ssn->ssl = SSL_new(ssn->ctx); if (!ssn->ssl) { talloc_free(ssn); return NULL; } request = request_alloc(ssn); SSL_set_ex_data(ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_REQUEST, (void *)request); /* * Add the message callback to identify what type of * message/handshake is passed */ SSL_set_msg_callback(ssn->ssl, cbtls_msg); SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssn->ssl, ssn); SSL_set_info_callback(ssn->ssl, cbtls_info); /* * Always verify the peer certificate. */ DEBUG2("Requiring Server certificate"); verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_PEER; verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT; SSL_set_verify(ssn->ssl, verify_mode, cbtls_verify); SSL_set_ex_data(ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF, (void *)conf); SSL_set_ex_data(ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_SSN, (void *)ssn); SSL_set_fd(ssn->ssl, fd); if (SSL_connect(ssn->ssl) <= 0) { int err; while ((err = ERR_get_error())) { ERROR("tls: %s", ERR_error_string(err, NULL)); } talloc_free(ssn); return NULL; } ssn->mtu = conf->fragment_size; return ssn; } /** Create a new TLS session * * Configures a new TLS session, configuring options, setting callbacks etc... * * @param ctx to alloc session data in. Should usually be NULL unless the lifetime of the * session is tied to another talloc'd object. * @param conf to use to configure the tls session. * @param request The current #REQUEST. * @param client_cert Whether to require a client_cert. * @return a new session on success, or NULL on error. */ tls_session_t *tls_new_session(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf, REQUEST *request, bool client_cert) { tls_session_t *state = NULL; SSL *new_tls = NULL; int verify_mode = 0; VALUE_PAIR *vp; rad_assert(request != NULL); RDEBUG2("Initiating new EAP-TLS session"); /* * Manually flush the sessions every so often. If HALF * of the session lifetime has passed since we last * flushed, then flush it again. * * FIXME: Also do it every N sessions? */ if (conf->session_cache_enable && ((conf->session_last_flushed + ((int)conf->session_timeout * 1800)) <= request->timestamp)){ RDEBUG2("Flushing SSL sessions (of #%ld)", SSL_CTX_sess_number(conf->ctx)); SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(conf->ctx, request->timestamp); conf->session_last_flushed = request->timestamp; } if ((new_tls = SSL_new(conf->ctx)) == NULL) { RERROR("Error creating new SSL session: %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); return NULL; } /* We use the SSL's "app_data" to indicate a call-back */ SSL_set_app_data(new_tls, NULL); if ((state = talloc_zero(ctx, tls_session_t)) == NULL) { RERROR("Error allocating memory for SSL state"); return NULL; } session_init(state); talloc_set_destructor(state, _tls_session_free); state->ctx = conf->ctx; state->ssl = new_tls; /* * Initialize callbacks */ state->record_init = record_init; state->record_close = record_close; state->record_plus = record_plus; state->record_minus = record_minus; /* * Create & hook the BIOs to handle the dirty side of the * SSL. This is *very important* as we want to handle * the transmission part. Now the only IO interface * that SSL is aware of, is our defined BIO buffers. * * This means that all SSL IO is done to/from memory, * and we can update those BIOs from the packets we've * received. */ state->into_ssl = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); state->from_ssl = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); SSL_set_bio(state->ssl, state->into_ssl, state->from_ssl); /* * Add the message callback to identify what type of * message/handshake is passed */ SSL_set_msg_callback(new_tls, cbtls_msg); SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(new_tls, state); SSL_set_info_callback(new_tls, cbtls_info); /* * In Server mode we only accept. */ SSL_set_accept_state(state->ssl); /* * Verify the peer certificate, if asked. */ if (client_cert) { RDEBUG2("Setting verify mode to require certificate from client"); verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_PEER; verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT; verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE; } SSL_set_verify(state->ssl, verify_mode, cbtls_verify); SSL_set_ex_data(state->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF, (void *)conf); SSL_set_ex_data(state->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_SSN, (void *)state); state->length_flag = conf->include_length; /* * We use default fragment size, unless the Framed-MTU * tells us it's too big. Note that we do NOT account * for the EAP-TLS headers if conf->fragment_size is * large, because that config item looks to be confusing. * * i.e. it should REALLY be called MTU, and the code here * should figure out what that means for TLS fragment size. * asking the administrator to know the internal details * of EAP-TLS in order to calculate fragment sizes is * just too much. */ state->mtu = conf->fragment_size; vp = pairfind(request->packet->vps, PW_FRAMED_MTU, 0, TAG_ANY); if (vp && (vp->vp_integer > 100) && (vp->vp_integer < state->mtu)) { state->mtu = vp->vp_integer; } if (conf->session_cache_enable) state->allow_session_resumption = true; /* otherwise it's false */ return state; } /* * Print out some text describing the error. */ static int int_ssl_check(REQUEST *request, SSL *s, int ret, char const *text) { int e; unsigned long l; if ((l = ERR_get_error()) != 0) { char const *p = ERR_error_string(l, NULL); if (p) ROPTIONAL(REDEBUG, ERROR, "SSL says: %s", p); } e = SSL_get_error(s, ret); switch (e) { /* * These seem to be harmless and already "dealt * with" by our non-blocking environment. NB: * "ZERO_RETURN" is the clean "error" * indicating a successfully closed SSL * tunnel. We let this happen because our IO * loop should not appear to have broken on * this condition - and outside the IO loop, the * "shutdown" state is checked. * * Don't print anything if we ignore the error. */ case SSL_ERROR_NONE: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP: case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: break; /* * These seem to be indications of a genuine * error that should result in the SSL tunnel * being regarded as "dead". */ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: ROPTIONAL(REDEBUG, ERROR, "%s failed in a system call (%d), TLS session failed", text, ret); return 0; case SSL_ERROR_SSL: ROPTIONAL(REDEBUG, ERROR, "%s failed inside of TLS (%d), TLS session failed", text, ret); return 0; /* * For any other errors that (a) exist, and (b) * crop up - we need to interpret what to do with * them - so "politely inform" the caller that * the code needs updating here. */ default: ROPTIONAL(REDEBUG, ERROR, "FATAL SSL error: %d", e); return 0; } return 1; } /* * We are the server, we always get the dirty data * (Handshake data is also considered as dirty data) * During handshake, since SSL API handles itself, * After clean-up, dirty_out will be filled with * the data required for handshaking. So we check * if dirty_out is empty then we simply send it back. * As of now, if handshake is successful, then we keep going, * otherwise we fail. * * Fill the Bio with the dirty data to clean it * Get the cleaned data from SSL, if it is not Handshake data */ int tls_handshake_recv(REQUEST *request, tls_session_t *ssn) { int err; if (ssn->invalid_hb_used) return 0; err = BIO_write(ssn->into_ssl, ssn->dirty_in.data, ssn->dirty_in.used); if (err != (int) ssn->dirty_in.used) { REDEBUG("Failed writing %zd bytes to SSL BIO: %d", ssn->dirty_in.used, err); record_init(&ssn->dirty_in); return 0; } record_init(&ssn->dirty_in); err = SSL_read(ssn->ssl, ssn->clean_out.data + ssn->clean_out.used, sizeof(ssn->clean_out.data) - ssn->clean_out.used); if (err > 0) { ssn->clean_out.used += err; return 1; } if (!int_ssl_check(request, ssn->ssl, err, "SSL_read")) return 0; /* Some Extra STATE information for easy debugging */ if (SSL_is_init_finished(ssn->ssl)) RDEBUG2("SSL Connection Established"); if (SSL_in_init(ssn->ssl)) RDEBUG2("In SSL Handshake Phase"); if (SSL_in_before(ssn->ssl)) RDEBUG2("Before SSL Handshake Phase"); if (SSL_in_accept_init(ssn->ssl)) RDEBUG2("In SSL Accept mode"); if (SSL_in_connect_init(ssn->ssl)) RDEBUG2("In SSL Connect mode"); err = BIO_ctrl_pending(ssn->from_ssl); if (err > 0) { err = BIO_read(ssn->from_ssl, ssn->dirty_out.data, sizeof(ssn->dirty_out.data)); if (err > 0) { ssn->dirty_out.used = err; } else if (BIO_should_retry(ssn->from_ssl)) { record_init(&ssn->dirty_in); RDEBUG2("Asking for more data in tunnel"); return 1; } else { int_ssl_check(request, ssn->ssl, err, "BIO_read"); record_init(&ssn->dirty_in); return 0; } } else { RDEBUG2("SSL Application Data"); /* Its clean application data, do whatever we want */ record_init(&ssn->clean_out); } /* We are done with dirty_in, reinitialize it */ record_init(&ssn->dirty_in); return 1; } /* * Take cleartext user data, and encrypt it into the output buffer, * to send to the client at the other end of the SSL connection. */ int tls_handshake_send(REQUEST *request, tls_session_t *ssn) { int err; /* * If there's un-encrypted data in 'clean_in', then write * that data to the SSL session, and then call the BIO function * to get that encrypted data from the SSL session, into * a buffer which we can then package into an EAP packet. * * Based on Server's logic this clean_in is expected to * contain the data to send to the client. */ if (ssn->clean_in.used > 0) { int written; written = SSL_write(ssn->ssl, ssn->clean_in.data, ssn->clean_in.used); record_minus(&ssn->clean_in, NULL, written); /* Get the dirty data from Bio to send it */ err = BIO_read(ssn->from_ssl, ssn->dirty_out.data, sizeof(ssn->dirty_out.data)); if (err > 0) { ssn->dirty_out.used = err; } else { int_ssl_check(request, ssn->ssl, err, "handshake_send"); } } return 1; } static void session_init(tls_session_t *ssn) { ssn->ssl = NULL; ssn->into_ssl = ssn->from_ssl = NULL; record_init(&ssn->clean_in); record_init(&ssn->clean_out); record_init(&ssn->dirty_in); record_init(&ssn->dirty_out); memset(&ssn->info, 0, sizeof(ssn->info)); ssn->mtu = 0; ssn->fragment = false; ssn->tls_msg_len = 0; ssn->length_flag = false; ssn->opaque = NULL; ssn->free_opaque = NULL; } static void session_close(tls_session_t *ssn) { SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(ssn->ssl, 1); SSL_shutdown(ssn->ssl); if (ssn->ssl) { SSL_free(ssn->ssl); ssn->ssl = NULL; } record_close(&ssn->clean_in); record_close(&ssn->clean_out); record_close(&ssn->dirty_in); record_close(&ssn->dirty_out); session_init(ssn); } static void record_init(record_t *rec) { rec->used = 0; } static void record_close(record_t *rec) { rec->used = 0; } /* * Copy data to the intermediate buffer, before we send * it somewhere. */ static unsigned int record_plus(record_t *rec, void const *ptr, unsigned int size) { unsigned int added = MAX_RECORD_SIZE - rec->used; if(added > size) added = size; if(added == 0) return 0; memcpy(rec->data + rec->used, ptr, added); rec->used += added; return added; } /* * Take data from the buffer, and give it to the caller. */ static unsigned int record_minus(record_t *rec, void *ptr, unsigned int size) { unsigned int taken = rec->used; if(taken > size) taken = size; if(taken == 0) return 0; if(ptr) memcpy(ptr, rec->data, taken); rec->used -= taken; /* * This is pretty bad... */ if(rec->used > 0) memmove(rec->data, rec->data + taken, rec->used); return taken; } void tls_session_information(tls_session_t *tls_session) { char const *str_write_p, *str_version, *str_content_type = ""; char const *str_details1 = "", *str_details2= ""; REQUEST *request; char buffer[32]; /* * Don't print this out in the normal course of * operations. */ if (rad_debug_lvl == 0) { return; } str_write_p = tls_session->info.origin ? ">>>" : "<<<"; switch (tls_session->info.version) { case SSL2_VERSION: str_version = "SSL 2.0 "; break; case SSL3_VERSION: str_version = "SSL 3.0 "; break; case TLS1_VERSION: str_version = "TLS 1.0 "; break; #ifdef TLS1_1_VERSION case TLS1_1_VERSION: str_version = "TLS 1.1 "; break; #endif #ifdef TLS1_2_VERSION case TLS1_2_VERSION: str_version = "TLS 1.2 "; break; #endif #ifdef TLS1_3_VERSON case TLS1_3_VERSION: str_version = "TLS 1.3 "; break; #endif default: sprintf(buffer, "UNKNOWN TLS VERSION ?%04X?", tls_session->info.version); str_version = buffer; break; } if (tls_session->info.version == SSL3_VERSION || tls_session->info.version == TLS1_VERSION) { switch (tls_session->info.content_type) { case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: str_content_type = "ChangeCipherSpec"; break; case SSL3_RT_ALERT: str_content_type = "Alert"; break; case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: str_content_type = "Handshake"; break; case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: str_content_type = "ApplicationData"; break; default: str_content_type = "UnknownContentType"; break; } if (tls_session->info.content_type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { str_details1 = ", ???"; if (tls_session->info.record_len == 2) { switch (tls_session->info.alert_level) { case SSL3_AL_WARNING: str_details1 = ", warning"; break; case SSL3_AL_FATAL: str_details1 = ", fatal"; break; } str_details2 = " ???"; switch (tls_session->info.alert_description) { case SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: str_details2 = " close_notify"; break; case SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: str_details2 = " unexpected_message"; break; case SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: str_details2 = " bad_record_mac"; break; case TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: str_details2 = " decryption_failed"; break; case TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: str_details2 = " record_overflow"; break; case SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE: str_details2 = " decompression_failure"; break; case SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: str_details2 = " handshake_failure"; break; case SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: str_details2 = " bad_certificate"; break; case SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE: str_details2 = " unsupported_certificate"; break; case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED: str_details2 = " certificate_revoked"; break; case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED: str_details2 = " certificate_expired"; break; case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN: str_details2 = " certificate_unknown"; break; case SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: str_details2 = " illegal_parameter"; break; case TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: str_details2 = " unknown_ca"; break; case TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: str_details2 = " access_denied"; break; case TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR: str_details2 = " decode_error"; break; case TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: str_details2 = " decrypt_error"; break; case TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: str_details2 = " export_restriction"; break; case TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: str_details2 = " protocol_version"; break; case TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY: str_details2 = " insufficient_security"; break; case TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: str_details2 = " internal_error"; break; case TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED: str_details2 = " user_canceled"; break; case TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: str_details2 = " no_renegotiation"; break; } } } if (tls_session->info.content_type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { str_details1 = "???"; if (tls_session->info.record_len > 0) switch (tls_session->info.handshake_type) { case SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST: str_details1 = ", HelloRequest"; break; case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO: str_details1 = ", ClientHello"; break; case SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO: str_details1 = ", ServerHello"; break; case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE: str_details1 = ", Certificate"; break; case SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE: str_details1 = ", ServerKeyExchange"; break; case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: str_details1 = ", CertificateRequest"; break; case SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE: str_details1 = ", ServerHelloDone"; break; case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: str_details1 = ", CertificateVerify"; break; case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE: str_details1 = ", ClientKeyExchange"; break; case SSL3_MT_FINISHED: str_details1 = ", Finished"; break; } } } snprintf(tls_session->info.info_description, sizeof(tls_session->info.info_description), "%s %s%s [length %04lx]%s%s\n", str_write_p, str_version, str_content_type, (unsigned long)tls_session->info.record_len, str_details1, str_details2); request = SSL_get_ex_data(tls_session->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_REQUEST); if (request) { RDEBUG2("%s", tls_session->info.info_description); } else { DEBUG2("%s", tls_session->info.info_description); } } static CONF_PARSER cache_config[] = { { "enable", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, session_cache_enable), "no" }, { "lifetime", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_INTEGER, fr_tls_server_conf_t, session_timeout), "24" }, { "name", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, session_id_name), NULL }, { "max_entries", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_INTEGER, fr_tls_server_conf_t, session_cache_size), "255" }, { "persist_dir", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, session_cache_path), NULL }, { NULL, -1, 0, NULL, NULL } /* end the list */ }; static CONF_PARSER verify_config[] = { { "tmpdir", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, verify_tmp_dir), NULL }, { "client", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, verify_client_cert_cmd), NULL }, { NULL, -1, 0, NULL, NULL } /* end the list */ }; #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H static CONF_PARSER ocsp_config[] = { { "enable", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ocsp_enable), "no" }, { "override_cert_url", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ocsp_override_url), "no" }, { "url", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ocsp_url), NULL }, { "use_nonce", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ocsp_use_nonce), "yes" }, { "timeout", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_INTEGER, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ocsp_timeout), "yes" }, { "softfail", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ocsp_softfail), "no" }, { NULL, -1, 0, NULL, NULL } /* end the list */ }; #endif static CONF_PARSER tls_server_config[] = { { "rsa_key_exchange", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, rsa_key), "no" }, { "dh_key_exchange", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, dh_key), "yes" }, { "rsa_key_length", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_INTEGER, fr_tls_server_conf_t, rsa_key_length), "512" }, { "dh_key_length", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_INTEGER, fr_tls_server_conf_t, dh_key_length), "512" }, { "verify_depth", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_INTEGER, fr_tls_server_conf_t, verify_depth), "0" }, { "CA_path", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_FILE_INPUT | PW_TYPE_DEPRECATED, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ca_path), NULL }, { "ca_path", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_FILE_INPUT, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ca_path), NULL }, { "pem_file_type", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, file_type), "yes" }, { "private_key_file", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_FILE_INPUT, fr_tls_server_conf_t, private_key_file), NULL }, { "certificate_file", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_FILE_INPUT, fr_tls_server_conf_t, certificate_file), NULL }, { "CA_file", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_FILE_INPUT | PW_TYPE_DEPRECATED, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ca_file), NULL }, { "ca_file", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_FILE_INPUT, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ca_file), NULL }, { "private_key_password", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING | PW_TYPE_SECRET, fr_tls_server_conf_t, private_key_password), NULL }, #ifdef PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN { "psk_identity", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, psk_identity), NULL }, { "psk_hexphrase", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING | PW_TYPE_SECRET, fr_tls_server_conf_t, psk_password), NULL }, { "psk_query", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, psk_query), NULL }, #endif { "dh_file", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, dh_file), NULL }, { "random_file", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, random_file), NULL }, { "fragment_size", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_INTEGER, fr_tls_server_conf_t, fragment_size), "1024" }, { "include_length", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, include_length), "yes" }, { "check_crl", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_crl), "no" }, #ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL { "check_all_crl", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_all_crl), "no" }, #endif { "allow_expired_crl", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, allow_expired_crl), NULL }, { "check_cert_cn", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_cert_cn), NULL }, { "cipher_list", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, cipher_list), NULL }, { "check_cert_issuer", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_cert_issuer), NULL }, { "require_client_cert", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, require_client_cert), NULL }, #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH { "ecdh_curve", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ecdh_curve), "prime256v1" }, #endif #endif #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 { "disable_tlsv1", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, disable_tlsv1), NULL }, #endif #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 { "disable_tlsv1_1", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, disable_tlsv1_1), NULL }, #endif #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 { "disable_tlsv1_2", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, disable_tlsv1_2), NULL }, #endif { "cache", FR_CONF_POINTER(PW_TYPE_SUBSECTION, NULL), (void const *) cache_config }, { "verify", FR_CONF_POINTER(PW_TYPE_SUBSECTION, NULL), (void const *) verify_config }, #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H { "ocsp", FR_CONF_POINTER(PW_TYPE_SUBSECTION, NULL), (void const *) ocsp_config }, #endif { NULL, -1, 0, NULL, NULL } /* end the list */ }; static CONF_PARSER tls_client_config[] = { { "rsa_key_exchange", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, rsa_key), "no" }, { "dh_key_exchange", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, dh_key), "yes" }, { "rsa_key_length", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_INTEGER, fr_tls_server_conf_t, rsa_key_length), "512" }, { "dh_key_length", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_INTEGER, fr_tls_server_conf_t, dh_key_length), "512" }, { "verify_depth", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_INTEGER, fr_tls_server_conf_t, verify_depth), "0" }, { "ca_path", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_FILE_INPUT, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ca_path), NULL }, { "pem_file_type", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, file_type), "yes" }, { "private_key_file", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_FILE_INPUT, fr_tls_server_conf_t, private_key_file), NULL }, { "certificate_file", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_FILE_INPUT, fr_tls_server_conf_t, certificate_file), NULL }, { "ca_file", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_FILE_INPUT, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ca_file), NULL }, { "private_key_password", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING | PW_TYPE_SECRET, fr_tls_server_conf_t, private_key_password), NULL }, { "dh_file", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, dh_file), NULL }, { "random_file", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, random_file), NULL }, { "fragment_size", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_INTEGER, fr_tls_server_conf_t, fragment_size), "1024" }, { "include_length", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, include_length), "yes" }, { "check_crl", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_crl), "no" }, { "check_cert_cn", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_cert_cn), NULL }, { "cipher_list", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, cipher_list), NULL }, { "check_cert_issuer", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_cert_issuer), NULL }, #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH { "ecdh_curve", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ecdh_curve), "prime256v1" }, #endif #endif #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 { "disable_tlsv1", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, disable_tlsv1), NULL }, #endif #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 { "disable_tlsv1_1", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, disable_tlsv1_1), NULL }, #endif #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 { "disable_tlsv1_2", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, disable_tlsv1_2), NULL }, #endif { NULL, -1, 0, NULL, NULL } /* end the list */ }; /* * TODO: Check for the type of key exchange * like conf->dh_key */ static int load_dh_params(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *file) { DH *dh = NULL; BIO *bio; if (!file) return 0; if ((bio = BIO_new_file(file, "r")) == NULL) { ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Unable to open DH file - %s", file); return -1; } dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL); BIO_free(bio); if (!dh) { WARN(LOG_PREFIX ": Unable to set DH parameters. DH cipher suites may not work!"); WARN(LOG_PREFIX ": Fix this by running the OpenSSL command listed in eap.conf"); return 0; } if (SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh) < 0) { ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Unable to set DH parameters"); DH_free(dh); return -1; } DH_free(dh); return 0; } /* * Print debugging messages, and free data. */ #define MAX_SESSION_SIZE (256) static void cbtls_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess) { size_t size; char buffer[2 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1]; fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf; size = sess->session_id_length; if (size > MAX_SESSION_SIZE) size = MAX_SESSION_SIZE; fr_bin2hex(buffer, sess->session_id, size); conf = (fr_tls_server_conf_t *)SSL_CTX_get_app_data(ctx); if (!conf) { DEBUG(LOG_PREFIX ": Failed to find TLS configuration in session"); return; } { int rv; char filename[256]; DEBUG2(LOG_PREFIX ": Removing session %s from the cache", buffer); /* remove session and any cached VPs */ snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s%c%s.asn1", conf->session_cache_path, FR_DIR_SEP, buffer); rv = unlink(filename); if (rv != 0) { DEBUG2(LOG_PREFIX ": Could not remove persisted session file %s: %s", filename, fr_syserror(errno)); } /* VPs might be absent; might not have been written to disk yet */ snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s%c%s.vps", conf->session_cache_path, FR_DIR_SEP, buffer); unlink(filename); } return; } static int cbtls_new_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess) { size_t size; char buffer[2 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1]; fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf; unsigned char *sess_blob = NULL; REQUEST *request = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_REQUEST); conf = (fr_tls_server_conf_t *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF); if (!conf) { RWDEBUG("Failed to find TLS configuration in session"); return 0; } size = sess->session_id_length; if (size > MAX_SESSION_SIZE) size = MAX_SESSION_SIZE; fr_bin2hex(buffer, sess->session_id, size); { int fd, rv, todo, blob_len; char filename[256]; unsigned char *p; RDEBUG2("Serialising session %s, and storing in cache", buffer); /* find out what length data we need */ blob_len = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); if (blob_len < 1) { /* something went wrong */ RWDEBUG("Session serialisation failed, couldn't determine required buffer length"); return 0; } /* Do not convert to TALLOC - Thread safety */ /* alloc and convert to ASN.1 */ sess_blob = malloc(blob_len); if (!sess_blob) { RWDEBUG("Session serialisation failed, couldn't allocate buffer (%d bytes)", blob_len); return 0; } /* openssl mutates &p */ p = sess_blob; rv = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p); if (rv != blob_len) { RWDEBUG("Session serialisation failed"); goto error; } /* open output file */ snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s%c%s.asn1", conf->session_cache_path, FR_DIR_SEP, buffer); fd = open(filename, O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0600); if (fd < 0) { RERROR("Session serialisation failed, failed opening session file %s: %s", filename, fr_syserror(errno)); goto error; } todo = blob_len; p = sess_blob; while (todo > 0) { rv = write(fd, p, todo); if (rv < 1) { RWDEBUG("Failed writing session: %s", fr_syserror(errno)); close(fd); goto error; } p += rv; todo -= rv; } close(fd); RWDEBUG("Wrote session %s to %s (%d bytes)", buffer, filename, blob_len); } error: free(sess_blob); return 0; } static SSL_SESSION *cbtls_get_session(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy) { size_t size; char buffer[2 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1]; fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf; TALLOC_CTX *talloc_ctx; SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL; unsigned char *sess_data = NULL; PAIR_LIST *pairlist = NULL; REQUEST *request = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_REQUEST); rad_assert(request != NULL); size = len; if (size > MAX_SESSION_SIZE) size = MAX_SESSION_SIZE; fr_bin2hex(buffer, data, size); RDEBUG2("Peer requested cached session: %s", buffer); *copy = 0; conf = (fr_tls_server_conf_t *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF); if (!conf) { RWDEBUG("Failed to find TLS configuration in session"); return NULL; } talloc_ctx = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_TALLOC); { int rv, fd, todo; char filename[256]; unsigned char *p; struct stat st; VALUE_PAIR *vps = NULL; /* read in the cached VPs from the .vps file */ snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s%c%s.vps", conf->session_cache_path, FR_DIR_SEP, buffer); rv = pairlist_read(talloc_ctx, filename, &pairlist, 1); if (rv < 0) { /* not safe to un-persist a session w/o VPs */ RWDEBUG("Failed loading persisted VPs for session %s", buffer); goto err; } /* load the actual SSL session */ snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s%c%s.asn1", conf->session_cache_path, FR_DIR_SEP, buffer); fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY); if (fd < 0) { RWDEBUG("No persisted session file %s: %s", filename, fr_syserror(errno)); goto err; } rv = fstat(fd, &st); if (rv < 0) { RWDEBUG("Failed stating persisted session file %s: %s", filename, fr_syserror(errno)); close(fd); goto err; } sess_data = talloc_array(NULL, unsigned char, st.st_size); if (!sess_data) { RWDEBUG("Failed allocating buffer for persisted session (%d bytes)", (int) st.st_size); close(fd); goto err; } p = sess_data; todo = st.st_size; while (todo > 0) { rv = read(fd, p, todo); if (rv < 1) { RWDEBUG("Failed reading persisted session: %s", fr_syserror(errno)); close(fd); goto err; } todo -= rv; p += rv; } close(fd); /* openssl mutates &p */ p = sess_data; sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, (unsigned char const **)(void **) &p, st.st_size); if (!sess) { RWDEBUG("Failed loading persisted session: %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); goto err; } /* move the cached VPs into the session */ pairfilter(talloc_ctx, &vps, &pairlist->reply, 0, 0, TAG_ANY); SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(sess, fr_tls_ex_index_vps, vps); RWDEBUG("Successfully restored session %s", buffer); rdebug_pair_list(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, vps, "reply:"); } err: if (sess_data) talloc_free(sess_data); if (pairlist) pairlist_free(&pairlist); return sess; } #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H /* * This function extracts the OCSP Responder URL * from an existing x509 certificate. */ static int ocsp_parse_cert_url(X509 *cert, char **phost, char **pport, char **ppath, int *pssl) { int i; AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS *aia; ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *ad; aia = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_info_access, NULL, NULL); for (i = 0; i < sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(aia); i++) { ad = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_value(aia, i); if (OBJ_obj2nid(ad->method) == NID_ad_OCSP) { if (ad->location->type == GEN_URI) { if(OCSP_parse_url((char *) ad->location->d.ia5->data, phost, pport, ppath, pssl)) return 1; } } } return 0; } /* * This function sends a OCSP request to a defined OCSP responder * and checks the OCSP response for correctness. */ /* Maximum leeway in validity period: default 5 minutes */ #define MAX_VALIDITY_PERIOD (5 * 60) static int ocsp_check(REQUEST *request, X509_STORE *store, X509 *issuer_cert, X509 *client_cert, fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf) { OCSP_CERTID *certid; OCSP_REQUEST *req; OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL; OCSP_BASICRESP *bresp = NULL; char *host = NULL; char *port = NULL; char *path = NULL; char hostheader[1024]; int use_ssl = -1; long nsec = MAX_VALIDITY_PERIOD, maxage = -1; BIO *cbio, *bio_out; int ocsp_ok = 0; int status; ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd; int reason; #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000003f OCSP_REQ_CTX *ctx; int rc; struct timeval now; struct timeval when; #endif /* * Create OCSP Request */ certid = OCSP_cert_to_id(NULL, client_cert, issuer_cert); req = OCSP_REQUEST_new(); OCSP_request_add0_id(req, certid); if (conf->ocsp_use_nonce) OCSP_request_add1_nonce(req, NULL, 8); /* * Send OCSP Request and get OCSP Response */ /* Get OCSP responder URL */ if (conf->ocsp_override_url) { char *url; memcpy(&url, &conf->ocsp_url, sizeof(url)); /* Reading the libssl src, they do a strdup on the URL, so it could of been const *sigh* */ OCSP_parse_url(url, &host, &port, &path, &use_ssl); } else { ocsp_parse_cert_url(client_cert, &host, &port, &path, &use_ssl); } if (!host || !port || !path) { RWDEBUG("ocsp: Host / port / path missing. Not doing OCSP"); ocsp_ok = 2; goto ocsp_skip; } RDEBUG2("ocsp: Using responder URL \"http://%s:%s%s\"", host, port, path); /* Check host and port length are sane, then create Host: HTTP header */ if ((strlen(host) + strlen(port) + 2) > sizeof(hostheader)) { RWDEBUG("ocsp: Host and port too long"); goto ocsp_skip; } snprintf(hostheader, sizeof(hostheader), "%s:%s", host, port); /* Setup BIO socket to OCSP responder */ cbio = BIO_new_connect(host); bio_out = NULL; if (rad_debug_lvl) { if (default_log.dst == L_DST_STDOUT) { bio_out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); } else if (default_log.dst == L_DST_STDERR) { bio_out = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE); } } BIO_set_conn_port(cbio, port); #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1000003f BIO_do_connect(cbio); /* Send OCSP request and wait for response */ resp = OCSP_sendreq_bio(cbio, path, req); if (!resp) { REDEBUG("ocsp: Couldn't get OCSP response"); ocsp_ok = 2; goto ocsp_end; } #else if (conf->ocsp_timeout) BIO_set_nbio(cbio, 1); rc = BIO_do_connect(cbio); if ((rc <= 0) && ((!conf->ocsp_timeout) || !BIO_should_retry(cbio))) { REDEBUG("ocsp: Couldn't connect to OCSP responder"); ocsp_ok = 2; goto ocsp_end; } ctx = OCSP_sendreq_new(cbio, path, NULL, -1); if (!ctx) { REDEBUG("ocsp: Couldn't create OCSP request"); ocsp_ok = 2; goto ocsp_end; } if (!OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header(ctx, "Host", hostheader)) { REDEBUG("ocsp: Couldn't set Host header"); ocsp_ok = 2; goto ocsp_end; } if (!OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req(ctx, req)) { REDEBUG("ocsp: Couldn't add data to OCSP request"); ocsp_ok = 2; goto ocsp_end; } gettimeofday(&when, NULL); when.tv_sec += conf->ocsp_timeout; do { rc = OCSP_sendreq_nbio(&resp, ctx); if (conf->ocsp_timeout) { gettimeofday(&now, NULL); if (!timercmp(&now, &when, <)) break; } } while ((rc == -1) && BIO_should_retry(cbio)); if (conf->ocsp_timeout && (rc == -1) && BIO_should_retry(cbio)) { REDEBUG("ocsp: Response timed out"); ocsp_ok = 2; goto ocsp_end; } OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(ctx); if (rc == 0) { REDEBUG("ocsp: Couldn't get OCSP response"); ocsp_ok = 2; goto ocsp_end; } #endif /* Verify OCSP response status */ status = OCSP_response_status(resp); if (status != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL) { REDEBUG("ocsp: Response status: %s", OCSP_response_status_str(status)); goto ocsp_end; } bresp = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp); if (conf->ocsp_use_nonce && OCSP_check_nonce(req, bresp)!=1) { REDEBUG("ocsp: Response has wrong nonce value"); goto ocsp_end; } if (OCSP_basic_verify(bresp, NULL, store, 0)!=1){ REDEBUG("ocsp: Couldn't verify OCSP basic response"); goto ocsp_end; } /* Verify OCSP cert status */ if (!OCSP_resp_find_status(bresp, certid, &status, &reason, &rev, &thisupd, &nextupd)) { REDEBUG("ocsp: No Status found"); goto ocsp_end; } if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, nsec, maxage)) { if (bio_out) { BIO_puts(bio_out, "WARNING: Status times invalid.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_out); } goto ocsp_end; } if (bio_out) { BIO_puts(bio_out, "\tThis Update: "); ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bio_out, thisupd); BIO_puts(bio_out, "\n"); if (nextupd) { BIO_puts(bio_out, "\tNext Update: "); ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bio_out, nextupd); BIO_puts(bio_out, "\n"); } } switch (status) { case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD: RDEBUG2("ocsp: Cert status: good"); ocsp_ok = 1; break; default: /* REVOKED / UNKNOWN */ REDEBUG("ocsp: Cert status: %s", OCSP_cert_status_str(status)); if (reason != -1) REDEBUG("ocsp: Reason: %s", OCSP_crl_reason_str(reason)); if (bio_out) { BIO_puts(bio_out, "\tRevocation Time: "); ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bio_out, rev); BIO_puts(bio_out, "\n"); } break; } ocsp_end: /* Free OCSP Stuff */ OCSP_REQUEST_free(req); OCSP_RESPONSE_free(resp); free(host); free(port); free(path); BIO_free_all(cbio); if (bio_out) BIO_free(bio_out); OCSP_BASICRESP_free(bresp); ocsp_skip: switch (ocsp_ok) { case 1: RDEBUG2("ocsp: Certificate is valid"); break; case 2: if (conf->ocsp_softfail) { RWDEBUG("ocsp: Unable to check certificate, assuming it's valid"); RWDEBUG("ocsp: This may be insecure"); ocsp_ok = 1; } else { REDEBUG("ocsp: Unable to check certificate, failing"); ocsp_ok = 0; } break; default: REDEBUG("ocsp: Certificate has been expired/revoked"); break; } return ocsp_ok; } #endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H */ /* * For creating certificate attributes. */ static char const *cert_attr_names[8][2] = { { "TLS-Client-Cert-Serial", "TLS-Cert-Serial" }, { "TLS-Client-Cert-Expiration", "TLS-Cert-Expiration" }, { "TLS-Client-Cert-Subject", "TLS-Cert-Subject" }, { "TLS-Client-Cert-Issuer", "TLS-Cert-Issuer" }, { "TLS-Client-Cert-Common-Name", "TLS-Cert-Common-Name" }, { "TLS-Client-Cert-Subject-Alt-Name-Email", "TLS-Cert-Subject-Alt-Name-Email" }, { "TLS-Client-Cert-Subject-Alt-Name-Dns", "TLS-Cert-Subject-Alt-Name-Dns" }, { "TLS-Client-Cert-Subject-Alt-Name-Upn", "TLS-Cert-Subject-Alt-Name-Upn" } }; #define FR_TLS_SERIAL (0) #define FR_TLS_EXPIRATION (1) #define FR_TLS_SUBJECT (2) #define FR_TLS_ISSUER (3) #define FR_TLS_CN (4) #define FR_TLS_SAN_EMAIL (5) #define FR_TLS_SAN_DNS (6) #define FR_TLS_SAN_UPN (7) /* * Before trusting a certificate, you must make sure that the * certificate is 'valid'. There are several steps that your * application can take in determining if a certificate is * valid. Commonly used steps are: * * 1.Verifying the certificate's signature, and verifying that * the certificate has been issued by a trusted Certificate * Authority. * * 2.Verifying that the certificate is valid for the present date * (i.e. it is being presented within its validity dates). * * 3.Verifying that the certificate has not been revoked by its * issuing Certificate Authority, by checking with respect to a * Certificate Revocation List (CRL). * * 4.Verifying that the credentials presented by the certificate * fulfill additional requirements specific to the application, * such as with respect to access control lists or with respect * to OCSP (Online Certificate Status Processing). * * NOTE: This callback will be called multiple times based on the * depth of the root certificate chain */ int cbtls_verify(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { char subject[1024]; /* Used for the subject name */ char issuer[1024]; /* Used for the issuer name */ char attribute[1024]; char value[1024]; char common_name[1024]; char cn_str[1024]; char buf[64]; X509 *client_cert; X509_CINF *client_inf; STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *ext_list; SSL *ssl; int err, depth, lookup, loc; fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf; int my_ok = ok; ASN1_INTEGER *sn = NULL; ASN1_TIME *asn_time = NULL; VALUE_PAIR **certs; char **identity; #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H X509_STORE *ocsp_store = NULL; X509 *issuer_cert; #endif VALUE_PAIR *vp; TALLOC_CTX *talloc_ctx; REQUEST *request; client_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx); err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx); lookup = depth; /* * Log client/issuing cert. If there's an error, log * issuing cert. */ if ((lookup > 1) && !my_ok) lookup = 1; /* * Retrieve the pointer to the SSL of the connection currently treated * and the application specific data stored into the SSL object. */ ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()); conf = (fr_tls_server_conf_t *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF); if (!conf) return 1; request = (REQUEST *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_REQUEST); rad_assert(request != NULL); certs = (VALUE_PAIR **)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, fr_tls_ex_index_certs); identity = (char **)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_IDENTITY); #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H ocsp_store = (X509_STORE *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_STORE); #endif talloc_ctx = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_TALLOC); /* * Get the Serial Number */ buf[0] = '\0'; sn = X509_get_serialNumber(client_cert); RDEBUG2("Creating attributes from certificate OIDs"); RINDENT(); /* * For this next bit, we create the attributes *only* if * we're at the client or issuing certificate, AND we * have a user identity. i.e. we don't create the * attributes for RadSec connections. */ if (certs && identity && (lookup <= 1) && sn && ((size_t) sn->length < (sizeof(buf) / 2))) { char *p = buf; int i; for (i = 0; i < sn->length; i++) { sprintf(p, "%02x", (unsigned int)sn->data[i]); p += 2; } vp = pairmake(talloc_ctx, certs, cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_SERIAL][lookup], buf, T_OP_SET); rdebug_pair(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, vp, NULL); } /* * Get the Expiration Date */ buf[0] = '\0'; asn_time = X509_get_notAfter(client_cert); if (certs && identity && (lookup <= 1) && asn_time && (asn_time->length < (int) sizeof(buf))) { memcpy(buf, (char*) asn_time->data, asn_time->length); buf[asn_time->length] = '\0'; vp = pairmake(talloc_ctx, certs, cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_EXPIRATION][lookup], buf, T_OP_SET); rdebug_pair(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, vp, NULL); } /* * Get the Subject & Issuer */ subject[0] = issuer[0] = '\0'; X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(client_cert), subject, sizeof(subject)); subject[sizeof(subject) - 1] = '\0'; if (certs && identity && (lookup <= 1) && subject[0]) { vp = pairmake(talloc_ctx, certs, cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_SUBJECT][lookup], subject, T_OP_SET); rdebug_pair(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, vp, NULL); } X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert), issuer, sizeof(issuer)); issuer[sizeof(issuer) - 1] = '\0'; if (certs && identity && (lookup <= 1) && issuer[0]) { vp = pairmake(talloc_ctx, certs, cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_ISSUER][lookup], issuer, T_OP_SET); rdebug_pair(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, vp, NULL); } /* * Get the Common Name, if there is a subject. */ X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(client_cert), NID_commonName, common_name, sizeof(common_name)); common_name[sizeof(common_name) - 1] = '\0'; if (certs && identity && (lookup <= 1) && common_name[0] && subject[0]) { vp = pairmake(talloc_ctx, certs, cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_CN][lookup], common_name, T_OP_SET); rdebug_pair(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, vp, NULL); } /* * Get the RFC822 Subject Alternative Name */ loc = X509_get_ext_by_NID(client_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, 0); if (certs && (lookup <= 1) && (loc >= 0)) { X509_EXTENSION *ext = NULL; GENERAL_NAMES *names = NULL; int i; if ((ext = X509_get_ext(client_cert, loc)) && (names = X509V3_EXT_d2i(ext))) { for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(names); i++) { GENERAL_NAME *name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(names, i); switch (name->type) { #ifdef GEN_EMAIL case GEN_EMAIL: vp = pairmake(talloc_ctx, certs, cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_SAN_EMAIL][lookup], (char *) ASN1_STRING_data(name->d.rfc822Name), T_OP_SET); rdebug_pair(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, vp, NULL); break; #endif /* GEN_EMAIL */ #ifdef GEN_DNS case GEN_DNS: vp = pairmake(talloc_ctx, certs, cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_SAN_DNS][lookup], (char *) ASN1_STRING_data(name->d.dNSName), T_OP_SET); rdebug_pair(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, vp, NULL); break; #endif /* GEN_DNS */ #ifdef GEN_OTHERNAME case GEN_OTHERNAME: /* look for a MS UPN */ if (NID_ms_upn == OBJ_obj2nid(name->d.otherName->type_id)) { /* we've got a UPN - Must be ASN1-encoded UTF8 string */ if (name->d.otherName->value->type == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) { vp = pairmake(talloc_ctx, certs, cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_SAN_UPN][lookup], (char *) ASN1_STRING_data(name->d.otherName->value->value.utf8string), T_OP_SET); rdebug_pair(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, vp, NULL); break; } else { RWARN("Invalid UPN in Subject Alt Name (should be UTF-8)"); break; } } break; #endif /* GEN_OTHERNAME */ default: /* XXX TODO handle other SAN types */ break; } } } if (names != NULL) sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(names); } /* * If the CRL has expired, that might still be OK. */ if (!my_ok && (conf->allow_expired_crl) && (err == X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED)) { my_ok = 1; X509_STORE_CTX_set_error( ctx, 0 ); } if (!my_ok) { char const *p = X509_verify_cert_error_string(err); RERROR("SSL says error %d : %s", err, p); REXDENT(); return my_ok; } if (lookup == 0) { client_inf = client_cert->cert_info; ext_list = client_inf->extensions; } else { ext_list = NULL; } /* * Grab the X509 extensions, and create attributes out of them. * For laziness, we re-use the OpenSSL names */ if (certs && (sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(ext_list) > 0)) { int i, len; char *p; BIO *out; out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); strlcpy(attribute, "TLS-Client-Cert-", sizeof(attribute)); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(ext_list); i++) { ASN1_OBJECT *obj; X509_EXTENSION *ext; ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(ext_list, i); obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext); i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, obj); len = BIO_read(out, attribute + 16 , sizeof(attribute) - 16 - 1); if (len <= 0) continue; attribute[16 + len] = '\0'; for (p = attribute + 16; *p != '\0'; p++) { if (*p == ' ') *p = '-'; } X509V3_EXT_print(out, ext, 0, 0); len = BIO_read(out, value , sizeof(value) - 1); if (len <= 0) continue; value[len] = '\0'; vp = pairmake(talloc_ctx, certs, attribute, value, T_OP_ADD); if (!vp) { RDEBUG3("Skipping %s += '%s'. Please check that both the " "attribute and value are defined in the dictionaries", attribute, value); } else { /* * rdebug_pair_list indents (so pre REXDENT()) */ REXDENT(); rdebug_pair_list(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, vp, NULL); RINDENT(); } } BIO_free_all(out); } REXDENT(); switch (ctx->error) { case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: RERROR("issuer=%s", issuer); break; case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: RERROR("notBefore="); #if 0 ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get_notBefore(ctx->current_cert)); #endif break; case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: RERROR("notAfter="); #if 0 ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get_notAfter(ctx->current_cert)); #endif break; } /* * If we're at the actual client cert, apply additional * checks. */ if (depth == 0) { /* * If the conf tells us to, check cert issuer * against the specified value and fail * verification if they don't match. */ if (conf->check_cert_issuer && (strcmp(issuer, conf->check_cert_issuer) != 0)) { AUTH(LOG_PREFIX ": Certificate issuer (%s) does not match specified value (%s)!", issuer, conf->check_cert_issuer); my_ok = 0; } /* * If the conf tells us to, check the CN in the * cert against xlat'ed value, but only if the * previous checks passed. */ if (my_ok && conf->check_cert_cn) { if (radius_xlat(cn_str, sizeof(cn_str), request, conf->check_cert_cn, NULL, NULL) < 0) { /* if this fails, fail the verification */ my_ok = 0; } else { RDEBUG2("checking certificate CN (%s) with xlat'ed value (%s)", common_name, cn_str); if (strcmp(cn_str, common_name) != 0) { AUTH(LOG_PREFIX ": Certificate CN (%s) does not match specified value (%s)!", common_name, cn_str); my_ok = 0; } } } /* check_cert_cn */ #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H if (my_ok && conf->ocsp_enable){ RDEBUG2("Starting OCSP Request"); if (X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer(&issuer_cert, ctx, client_cert) != 1) { RERROR("Couldn't get issuer_cert for %s", common_name); } else { my_ok = ocsp_check(request, ocsp_store, issuer_cert, client_cert, conf); } } #endif while (conf->verify_client_cert_cmd) { char filename[256]; int fd; FILE *fp; snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/%s.client.XXXXXXXX", conf->verify_tmp_dir, progname); fd = mkstemp(filename); if (fd < 0) { RDEBUG("Failed creating file in %s: %s", conf->verify_tmp_dir, fr_syserror(errno)); break; } fp = fdopen(fd, "w"); if (!fp) { close(fd); RDEBUG("Failed opening file %s: %s", filename, fr_syserror(errno)); break; } if (!PEM_write_X509(fp, client_cert)) { fclose(fp); RDEBUG("Failed writing certificate to file"); goto do_unlink; } fclose(fp); if (!pairmake_packet("TLS-Client-Cert-Filename", filename, T_OP_SET)) { RDEBUG("Failed creating TLS-Client-Cert-Filename"); goto do_unlink; } RDEBUG("Verifying client certificate: %s", conf->verify_client_cert_cmd); if (radius_exec_program(request, NULL, 0, NULL, request, conf->verify_client_cert_cmd, request->packet->vps, true, true, EXEC_TIMEOUT) != 0) { AUTH(LOG_PREFIX ": Certificate CN (%s) fails external verification!", common_name); my_ok = 0; } else { RDEBUG("Client certificate CN %s passed external validation", common_name); } do_unlink: unlink(filename); break; } } /* depth == 0 */ if (RDEBUG_ENABLED3) { RDEBUG3("chain-depth : %d", depth); RDEBUG3("error : %d", err); if (identity) RDEBUG3("identity : %s", *identity); RDEBUG3("common name : %s", common_name); RDEBUG3("subject : %s", subject); RDEBUG3("issuer : %s", issuer); RDEBUG3("verify return : %d", my_ok); } return my_ok; } #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H /* * Create Global X509 revocation store and use it to verify * OCSP responses * * - Load the trusted CAs * - Load the trusted issuer certificates */ static X509_STORE *init_revocation_store(fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf) { X509_STORE *store = NULL; store = X509_STORE_new(); /* Load the CAs we trust */ if (conf->ca_file || conf->ca_path) if(!X509_STORE_load_locations(store, conf->ca_file, conf->ca_path)) { ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": X509_STORE error %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Error reading Trusted root CA list %s",conf->ca_file ); return NULL; } #ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK if (conf->check_crl) X509_STORE_set_flags(store, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK); #endif #ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL if (conf->check_all_crl) X509_STORE_set_flags(store, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL); #endif return store; } #endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H */ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH static int set_ecdh_curve(SSL_CTX *ctx, char const *ecdh_curve) { int nid; EC_KEY *ecdh; if (!ecdh_curve || !*ecdh_curve) return 0; nid = OBJ_sn2nid(ecdh_curve); if (!nid) { ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Unknown ecdh_curve \"%s\"", ecdh_curve); return -1; } ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid); if (!ecdh) { ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Unable to create new curve \"%s\"", ecdh_curve); return -1; } SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(ctx, ecdh); SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE); EC_KEY_free(ecdh); return 0; } #endif #endif /* * DIE OPENSSL DIE DIE DIE * * What a palaver, just to free some data attached the * session. We need to do this because the "remove" callback * is called when refcount > 0 sometimes, if another thread * is using the session */ static void sess_free_vps(UNUSED void *parent, void *data_ptr, UNUSED CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, UNUSED int idx, UNUSED long argl, UNUSED void *argp) { VALUE_PAIR *vp = data_ptr; if (!vp) return; DEBUG2(LOG_PREFIX ": Freeing cached session VPs"); pairfree(&vp); } static void sess_free_certs(UNUSED void *parent, void *data_ptr, UNUSED CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, UNUSED int idx, UNUSED long argl, UNUSED void *argp) { VALUE_PAIR **certs = data_ptr; if (!certs) return; DEBUG2(LOG_PREFIX ": Freeing cached session Certificates"); pairfree(certs); } /** Add all the default ciphers and message digests reate our context. * * This should be called exactly once from main, before reading the main config * or initialising any modules. */ void tls_global_init(void) { SSL_load_error_strings(); /* readable error messages (examples show call before library_init) */ SSL_library_init(); /* initialize library */ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); /* required for SHA2 in OpenSSL < 0.9.8o and 1.0.0.a */ OPENSSL_config(NULL); /* * Initialize the index for the certificates. */ fr_tls_ex_index_certs = SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, sess_free_certs); } #ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_VERSION_CHECK /** Check for vulnerable versions of libssl * * @param acknowledged The highest CVE number a user has confirmed is not present in the system's libssl. * @return 0 if the CVE specified by the user matches the most recent CVE we have, else -1. */ int tls_global_version_check(char const *acknowledged) { uint64_t v; if ((strcmp(acknowledged, libssl_defects[0].id) != 0) && (strcmp(acknowledged, "yes") != 0)) { bool bad = false; size_t i; /* Check for bad versions */ v = (uint64_t) SSLeay(); for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(libssl_defects) / sizeof(*libssl_defects)); i++) { libssl_defect_t *defect = &libssl_defects[i]; if ((v >= defect->low) && (v <= defect->high)) { ERROR("Refusing to start with libssl version %s (in range %s)", ssl_version(), ssl_version_range(defect->low, defect->high)); ERROR("Security advisory %s (%s)", defect->id, defect->name); ERROR("%s", defect->comment); bad = true; } } if (bad) { INFO("Once you have verified libssl has been correctly patched, " "set security.allow_vulnerable_openssl = '%s'", libssl_defects[0].id); return -1; } } return 0; } #endif /** Free any memory alloced by libssl * */ void tls_global_cleanup(void) { ERR_remove_state(0); ENGINE_cleanup(); CONF_modules_unload(1); ERR_free_strings(); EVP_cleanup(); CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(); } /** Create SSL context * * - Load the trusted CAs * - Load the Private key & the certificate * - Set the Context options & Verify options */ SSL_CTX *tls_init_ctx(fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf, int client) { SSL_CTX *ctx; X509_STORE *certstore; int verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; int ctx_options = 0; int ctx_tls_versions = 0; int type; /* * SHA256 is in all versions of OpenSSL, but isn't * initialized by default. It's needed for WiMAX * certificates. */ #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_SHA256 EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256()); #endif ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method()); /* which is really "all known SSL / TLS methods". Idiots. */ if (!ctx) { int err; while ((err = ERR_get_error())) { ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Failed creating SSL context: %s", ERR_error_string(err, NULL)); return NULL; } } /* * Save the config on the context so that callbacks which * only get SSL_CTX* e.g. session persistence, can get it */ SSL_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, conf); /* * Identify the type of certificates that needs to be loaded */ if (conf->file_type) { type = SSL_FILETYPE_PEM; } else { type = SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1; } /* * Set the password to load private key */ if (conf->private_key_password) { #ifdef __APPLE__ /* * We don't want to put the private key password in eap.conf, so check * for our special string which indicates we should get the password * programmatically. */ char const* special_string = "Apple:UseCertAdmin"; if (strncmp(conf->private_key_password, special_string, strlen(special_string)) == 0) { char cmd[256]; char *password; long const max_password_len = 128; snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd) - 1, "/usr/sbin/certadmin --get-private-key-passphrase \"%s\"", conf->private_key_file); DEBUG2(LOG_PREFIX ": Getting private key passphrase using command \"%s\"", cmd); FILE* cmd_pipe = popen(cmd, "r"); if (!cmd_pipe) { ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": %s command failed: Unable to get private_key_password", cmd); ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Error reading private_key_file %s", conf->private_key_file); return NULL; } rad_const_free(conf->private_key_password); password = talloc_array(conf, char, max_password_len); if (!password) { ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Can't allocate space for private_key_password"); ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Error reading private_key_file %s", conf->private_key_file); pclose(cmd_pipe); return NULL; } fgets(password, max_password_len, cmd_pipe); pclose(cmd_pipe); /* Get rid of newline at end of password. */ password[strlen(password) - 1] = '\0'; DEBUG3(LOG_PREFIX ": Password from command = \"%s\"", password); conf->private_key_password = password; } #endif { char *password; memcpy(&password, &conf->private_key_password, sizeof(password)); SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ctx, password); SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ctx, cbtls_password); } } #ifdef PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN if (!client) { /* * No dynamic query exists. There MUST be a * statically configured identity and password. */ if (conf->psk_query && !*conf->psk_query) { ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Invalid PSK Configuration: psk_query cannot be empty"); return NULL; } /* * Set the callback only if we can check things. */ if (conf->psk_identity || conf->psk_query) { SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(ctx, psk_server_callback); } } else if (conf->psk_query) { ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Invalid PSK Configuration: psk_query cannot be used for outgoing connections"); return NULL; } /* * Now check that if PSK is being used, the config is valid. */ if ((conf->psk_identity && !conf->psk_password) || (!conf->psk_identity && conf->psk_password) || (conf->psk_identity && !*conf->psk_identity) || (conf->psk_password && !*conf->psk_password)) { ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Invalid PSK Configuration: psk_identity or psk_password are empty"); return NULL; } if (conf->psk_identity) { size_t psk_len, hex_len; uint8_t buffer[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; if (conf->certificate_file || conf->private_key_password || conf->private_key_file || conf->ca_file || conf->ca_path) { ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": When PSKs are used, No certificate configuration is permitted"); return NULL; } if (client) { SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(ctx, psk_client_callback); } psk_len = strlen(conf->psk_password); if (strlen(conf->psk_password) > (2 * PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)) { ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": psk_hexphrase is too long (max %d)", PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN); return NULL; } /* * Check the password now, so that we don't have * errors at run-time. */ hex_len = fr_hex2bin(buffer, sizeof(buffer), conf->psk_password, psk_len); if (psk_len != (2 * hex_len)) { ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": psk_hexphrase is not all hex"); return NULL; } goto post_ca; } #else (void) client; /* -Wunused */ #endif /* * Load our keys and certificates * * If certificates are of type PEM then we can make use * of cert chain authentication using openssl api call * SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file. Please see how * the cert chain needs to be given in PEM from * openSSL.org */ if (!conf->certificate_file) goto load_ca; if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) { if (!(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, conf->certificate_file))) { ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Error reading certificate file %s:%s", conf->certificate_file, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); return NULL; } } else if (!(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, conf->certificate_file, type))) { ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Error reading certificate file %s:%s", conf->certificate_file, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); return NULL; } /* Load the CAs we trust */ load_ca: if (conf->ca_file || conf->ca_path) { if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, conf->ca_file, conf->ca_path)) { ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": SSL error %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Error reading Trusted root CA list %s",conf->ca_file ); return NULL; } } if (conf->ca_file && *conf->ca_file) SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, SSL_load_client_CA_file(conf->ca_file)); if (conf->private_key_file) { if (!(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, conf->private_key_file, type))) { ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Failed reading private key file %s:%s", conf->private_key_file, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); return NULL; } /* * Check if the loaded private key is the right one */ if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) { ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Private key does not match the certificate public key"); return NULL; } } #ifdef PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN post_ca: #endif /* * We never want SSLv2 or SSLv3. */ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2; ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3; /* * As of 3.0.5, we always allow TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2. * Though they can be *globally* disabled if necessary.x */ #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 if (conf->disable_tlsv1) ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1; ctx_tls_versions |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1; #endif #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 if (conf->disable_tlsv1_1) ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1; ctx_tls_versions |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1; #endif #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 if (conf->disable_tlsv1_2) ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2; ctx_tls_versions |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2; #endif if ((ctx_options & ctx_tls_versions) == ctx_tls_versions) { ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": You have disabled all available TLS versions. EAP will not work"); return NULL; } #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; #endif /* * SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used in order to prevent * small subgroup attacks and forward secrecy. Always * using * * SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE has an impact on the computer * time needed during negotiation, but it is not very * large. */ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE; /* * SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS to work around issues * in Windows Vista client. * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt * http://www.nabble.com/(RADIATOR)-Radiator-Version-3.16-released-t2600070.html */ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS; SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, ctx_options); /* * TODO: Set the RSA & DH * SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ctx, cbtls_rsa); * SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(ctx, cbtls_dh); */ /* * set the message callback to identify the type of * message. For every new session, there can be a * different callback argument. * * SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(ctx, cbtls_msg); */ /* * Set eliptical curve crypto configuration. */ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (set_ecdh_curve(ctx, conf->ecdh_curve) < 0) { return NULL; } #endif #endif /* Set Info callback */ SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, cbtls_info); /* * Callbacks, etc. for session resumption. */ if (conf->session_cache_enable) { /* * Cache sessions on disk if requested. */ if (conf->session_cache_path) { SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(ctx, cbtls_new_session); SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(ctx, cbtls_get_session); SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(ctx, cbtls_remove_session); } SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(ctx, 1); if (fr_tls_ex_index_vps < 0) fr_tls_ex_index_vps = SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, sess_free_vps); } /* * Check the certificates for revocation. */ #ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK if (conf->check_crl) { certstore = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx); if (certstore == NULL) { ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": SSL error %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Error reading Certificate Store"); return NULL; } X509_STORE_set_flags(certstore, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK); #ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL if (conf->check_all_crl) X509_STORE_set_flags(certstore, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL); #endif } #endif /* * Set verify modes * Always verify the peer certificate */ verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_PEER; verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT; verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE; SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify_mode, cbtls_verify); if (conf->verify_depth) { SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(ctx, conf->verify_depth); } /* Load randomness */ if (conf->random_file) { if (!(RAND_load_file(conf->random_file, 1024*10))) { ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": SSL error %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Error loading randomness"); return NULL; } } /* * Set the cipher list if we were told to */ if (conf->cipher_list) { if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, conf->cipher_list)) { ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Error setting cipher list"); return NULL; } } /* * Setup session caching */ if (conf->session_cache_enable) { /* * Create a unique context Id per EAP-TLS configuration. */ if (conf->session_id_name) { snprintf(conf->session_context_id, sizeof(conf->session_context_id), "FR eap %s", conf->session_id_name); } else { snprintf(conf->session_context_id, sizeof(conf->session_context_id), "FR eap %p", conf); } /* * Cache it, and DON'T auto-clear it. */ SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER | SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR); SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx, (unsigned char *) conf->session_context_id, (unsigned int) strlen(conf->session_context_id)); /* * Our timeout is in hours, this is in seconds. */ SSL_CTX_set_timeout(ctx, conf->session_timeout * 3600); /* * Set the maximum number of entries in the * session cache. */ SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx, conf->session_cache_size); } else { SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF); } return ctx; } /* * Free TLS client/server config * Should not be called outside this code, as a callback is * added to automatically free the data when the CONF_SECTION * is freed. */ static int _tls_server_conf_free(fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf) { if (conf->ctx) SSL_CTX_free(conf->ctx); #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H if (conf->ocsp_store) X509_STORE_free(conf->ocsp_store); conf->ocsp_store = NULL; #endif #ifndef NDEBUG memset(conf, 0, sizeof(*conf)); #endif return 0; } static fr_tls_server_conf_t *tls_server_conf_alloc(TALLOC_CTX *ctx) { fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf; conf = talloc_zero(ctx, fr_tls_server_conf_t); if (!conf) { ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Out of memory"); return NULL; } talloc_set_destructor(conf, _tls_server_conf_free); return conf; } fr_tls_server_conf_t *tls_server_conf_parse(CONF_SECTION *cs) { fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf; /* * If cs has already been parsed there should be a cached copy * of conf already stored, so just return that. */ conf = cf_data_find(cs, "tls-conf"); if (conf) { DEBUG(LOG_PREFIX ": Using cached TLS configuration from previous invocation"); return conf; } conf = tls_server_conf_alloc(cs); if (cf_section_parse(cs, conf, tls_server_config) < 0) { error: talloc_free(conf); return NULL; } /* * Save people from their own stupidity. */ if (conf->fragment_size < 100) conf->fragment_size = 100; if (!conf->private_key_file) { ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": TLS Server requires a private key file"); goto error; } if (!conf->certificate_file) { ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": TLS Server requires a certificate file"); goto error; } /* * Initialize TLS */ conf->ctx = tls_init_ctx(conf, 0); if (conf->ctx == NULL) { goto error; } #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H /* * Initialize OCSP Revocation Store */ if (conf->ocsp_enable) { conf->ocsp_store = init_revocation_store(conf); if (conf->ocsp_store == NULL) goto error; } #endif /*HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H*/ { char *dh_file; memcpy(&dh_file, &conf->dh_file, sizeof(dh_file)); if (load_dh_params(conf->ctx, dh_file) < 0) { goto error; } } if (conf->verify_tmp_dir) { if (chmod(conf->verify_tmp_dir, S_IRWXU) < 0) { ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Failed changing permissions on %s: %s", conf->verify_tmp_dir, fr_syserror(errno)); goto error; } } if (conf->verify_client_cert_cmd && !conf->verify_tmp_dir) { ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": You MUST set the verify directory in order to use verify_client_cmd"); goto error; } /* * Cache conf in cs in case we're asked to parse this again. */ cf_data_add(cs, "tls-conf", conf, NULL); return conf; } fr_tls_server_conf_t *tls_client_conf_parse(CONF_SECTION *cs) { fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf; conf = cf_data_find(cs, "tls-conf"); if (conf) { DEBUG2(LOG_PREFIX ": Using cached TLS configuration from previous invocation"); return conf; } conf = tls_server_conf_alloc(cs); if (cf_section_parse(cs, conf, tls_client_config) < 0) { error: talloc_free(conf); return NULL; } /* * Save people from their own stupidity. */ if (conf->fragment_size < 100) conf->fragment_size = 100; /* * Initialize TLS */ conf->ctx = tls_init_ctx(conf, 1); if (conf->ctx == NULL) { goto error; } { char *dh_file; memcpy(&dh_file, &conf->dh_file, sizeof(dh_file)); if (load_dh_params(conf->ctx, dh_file) < 0) { goto error; } } cf_data_add(cs, "tls-conf", conf, NULL); return conf; } int tls_success(tls_session_t *ssn, REQUEST *request) { VALUE_PAIR *vp, *vps = NULL; fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf; TALLOC_CTX *talloc_ctx; conf = (fr_tls_server_conf_t *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF); rad_assert(conf != NULL); talloc_ctx = SSL_get_ex_data(ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_TALLOC); /* * If there's no session resumption, delete the entry * from the cache. This means either it's disabled * globally for this SSL context, OR we were told to * disable it for this user. * * This also means you can't turn it on just for one * user. */ if ((!ssn->allow_session_resumption) || (((vp = pairfind(request->config, PW_ALLOW_SESSION_RESUMPTION, 0, TAG_ANY)) != NULL) && (vp->vp_integer == 0))) { SSL_CTX_remove_session(ssn->ctx, ssn->ssl->session); ssn->allow_session_resumption = false; /* * If we're in a resumed session and it's * not allowed, */ if (SSL_session_reused(ssn->ssl)) { RDEBUG("Forcibly stopping session resumption as it is not allowed"); return -1; } /* * Else resumption IS allowed, so we store the * user data in the cache. */ } else if (!SSL_session_reused(ssn->ssl)) { size_t size; VALUE_PAIR **certs; char buffer[2 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1]; size = ssn->ssl->session->session_id_length; if (size > MAX_SESSION_SIZE) size = MAX_SESSION_SIZE; fr_bin2hex(buffer, ssn->ssl->session->session_id, size); vp = paircopy_by_num(talloc_ctx, request->reply->vps, PW_USER_NAME, 0, TAG_ANY); if (vp) pairadd(&vps, vp); vp = paircopy_by_num(talloc_ctx, request->packet->vps, PW_STRIPPED_USER_NAME, 0, TAG_ANY); if (vp) pairadd(&vps, vp); vp = paircopy_by_num(talloc_ctx, request->packet->vps, PW_STRIPPED_USER_DOMAIN, 0, TAG_ANY); if (vp) pairadd(&vps, vp); vp = paircopy_by_num(talloc_ctx, request->reply->vps, PW_CHARGEABLE_USER_IDENTITY, 0, TAG_ANY); if (vp) pairadd(&vps, vp); vp = paircopy_by_num(talloc_ctx, request->reply->vps, PW_CACHED_SESSION_POLICY, 0, TAG_ANY); if (vp) pairadd(&vps, vp); certs = (VALUE_PAIR **)SSL_get_ex_data(ssn->ssl, fr_tls_ex_index_certs); /* * Hmm... the certs should probably be session data. */ if (certs) { /* * @todo: some go into reply, others into * request */ pairadd(&vps, paircopy(talloc_ctx, *certs)); /* * Save the certs in the packet, so that we can see them. */ pairadd(&request->packet->vps, paircopy(request->packet, *certs)); } if (vps) { SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(ssn->ssl->session, fr_tls_ex_index_vps, vps); rdebug_pair_list(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, vps, " caching "); if (conf->session_cache_path) { /* write the VPs to the cache file */ char filename[256], buf[1024]; FILE *vp_file; RDEBUG2("Saving session %s in the disk cache", buffer); snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s%c%s.vps", conf->session_cache_path, FR_DIR_SEP, buffer); vp_file = fopen(filename, "w"); if (vp_file == NULL) { RWDEBUG("Could not write session VPs to persistent cache: %s", fr_syserror(errno)); } else { VALUE_PAIR *prev = NULL; vp_cursor_t cursor; /* generate a dummy user-style entry which is easy to read back */ fprintf(vp_file, "# SSL cached session\n"); fprintf(vp_file, "%s\n\t", buffer); for (vp = fr_cursor_init(&cursor, &vps); vp; vp = fr_cursor_next(&cursor)) { /* * Terminate the previous line. */ if (prev) fprintf(vp_file, ",\n\t"); /* * Write this one. */ vp_prints(buf, sizeof(buf), vp); fputs(buf, vp_file); prev = vp; } /* * Terminate the final line. */ fprintf(vp_file, "\n"); fclose(vp_file); } } else { RDEBUG("Failed to find 'persist_dir' in TLS configuration. Session will not be cached on disk."); } } else { RDEBUG2("No information to cache: session caching will be disabled for session %s", buffer); SSL_CTX_remove_session(ssn->ctx, ssn->ssl->session); } /* * Else the session WAS allowed. Copy the cached reply. */ } else { size_t size; char buffer[2 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1]; size = ssn->ssl->session->session_id_length; if (size > MAX_SESSION_SIZE) size = MAX_SESSION_SIZE; fr_bin2hex(buffer, ssn->ssl->session->session_id, size); /* * The "restore VPs from OpenSSL cache" code is * now in eaptls_process() */ if (conf->session_cache_path) { /* "touch" the cached session/vp file */ char filename[256]; snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s%c%s.asn1", conf->session_cache_path, FR_DIR_SEP, buffer); utime(filename, NULL); snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s%c%s.vps", conf->session_cache_path, FR_DIR_SEP, buffer); utime(filename, NULL); } /* * Mark the request as resumed. */ pairmake_packet("EAP-Session-Resumed", "1", T_OP_SET); } return 0; } void tls_fail(tls_session_t *ssn) { /* * Force the session to NOT be cached. */ SSL_CTX_remove_session(ssn->ctx, ssn->ssl->session); } fr_tls_status_t tls_application_data(tls_session_t *ssn, REQUEST *request) { int err; VALUE_PAIR **certs; /* * Decrypt the complete record. */ err = BIO_write(ssn->into_ssl, ssn->dirty_in.data, ssn->dirty_in.used); if (err != (int) ssn->dirty_in.used) { record_init(&ssn->dirty_in); RDEBUG("Failed writing %zd bytes to SSL BIO: %d", ssn->dirty_in.used, err); return FR_TLS_FAIL; } /* * Clear the dirty buffer now that we are done with it * and init the clean_out buffer to store decrypted data */ record_init(&ssn->dirty_in); record_init(&ssn->clean_out); /* * Read (and decrypt) the tunneled data from the * SSL session, and put it into the decrypted * data buffer. */ err = SSL_read(ssn->ssl, ssn->clean_out.data, sizeof(ssn->clean_out.data)); if (err < 0) { int code; RDEBUG("SSL_read Error"); code = SSL_get_error(ssn->ssl, err); switch (code) { case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: DEBUG("Error in fragmentation logic: SSL_WANT_READ"); return FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: DEBUG("Error in fragmentation logic: SSL_WANT_WRITE"); break; default: DEBUG("Error in fragmentation logic: %s", ERR_error_string(code, NULL)); /* * FIXME: Call int_ssl_check? */ break; } return FR_TLS_FAIL; } if (err == 0) RWDEBUG("No data inside of the tunnel"); /* * Passed all checks, successfully decrypted data */ ssn->clean_out.used = err; /* * Add the certificates to intermediate packets, so that * the inner tunnel policies can use them. */ certs = (VALUE_PAIR **)SSL_get_ex_data(ssn->ssl, fr_tls_ex_index_certs); if (certs) pairadd(&request->packet->vps, paircopy(request->packet, *certs)); return FR_TLS_OK; } /* * Acknowledge received is for one of the following messages sent earlier * 1. Handshake completed Message, so now send, EAP-Success * 2. Alert Message, now send, EAP-Failure * 3. Fragment Message, now send, next Fragment */ fr_tls_status_t tls_ack_handler(tls_session_t *ssn, REQUEST *request) { if (ssn == NULL){ REDEBUG("Unexpected ACK received: No ongoing SSL session"); return FR_TLS_INVALID; } if (!ssn->info.initialized) { RDEBUG("No SSL info available. Waiting for more SSL data"); return FR_TLS_REQUEST; } if ((ssn->info.content_type == handshake) && (ssn->info.origin == 0)) { REDEBUG("Unexpected ACK received: We sent no previous messages"); return FR_TLS_INVALID; } switch (ssn->info.content_type) { case alert: RDEBUG2("Peer ACKed our alert"); return FR_TLS_FAIL; case handshake: if ((ssn->info.handshake_type == handshake_finished) && (ssn->dirty_out.used == 0)) { RDEBUG2("Peer ACKed our handshake fragment. handshake is finished"); /* * From now on all the content is * application data set it here as nobody else * sets it. */ ssn->info.content_type = application_data; return FR_TLS_SUCCESS; } /* else more data to send */ RDEBUG2("Peer ACKed our handshake fragment"); /* Fragmentation handler, send next fragment */ return FR_TLS_REQUEST; case application_data: RDEBUG2("Peer ACKed our application data fragment"); return FR_TLS_REQUEST; /* * For the rest of the conditions, switch over * to the default section below. */ default: REDEBUG("Invalid ACK received: %d", ssn->info.content_type); return FR_TLS_INVALID; } } #endif /* WITH_TLS */