TTLS+PAP with Windows
aland at deployingradius.com
Wed Mar 15 14:31:00 CET 2017
On Mar 15, 2017, at 6:00 AM, Herman Øie Kolden <herman at samfundet.no> wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 15, 2017 at 09:53:39AM +0100, Bjørn Mork wrote:
>> In general, you should use self-signed certificates for 802.1x (EAP)
>> authentication. When you list root CAs from other organizations in the
>> "CA_file", you permit them to masquerade as you,
> Why is this a concern for EAP, but not for regular web certificates?
Because you don't own google.com. So you don't care (so much) if someone else masquerades as google.com. In fact, you have *no idea* who "google.com" really is. All you know is that there's a certificate from a CA, which says that this site is really "google.com".
For most web browsing, that's good enough. The CA is pre-provisioned on your machine, which means you trust the CA, and then trust them to say who google really is.
For EAP, you own the site, so you *do* care who else can masquerade as you. By using a self-signed CA and provisioning it on the users machines, you're sure that no one else can pretend to be you.
>> to authenticate your users, and to issue client
>> certificates for EAP-TLS.
> Agreed, but as we don't use client certificates in our organization,
> this doesn't apply to us.
That's not how the protocols work.
If you allow EAP-TLS, you allow users to be authenticated with client certificates. *ANY* client certificate which has a chain of trust going back to the root CA.
When you use a public CA, you let *anyone on the planet* issue client certificates which will be accepted as genuine by your RADIUS server. Because that's how the certificate chain of trust works.
When you use a self-signed CA, the only person who can issue client certificates is you. And if you don't issue client certificates, you know that there are none which have been issued.
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