PEAP vs. TTLS and forward secrecy (was: Re: WPA2 Client Authentication using Radius and remote LDAP server)
alan.buxey at gmail.com
Sat Sep 22 12:45:20 CEST 2018
Both can also , depending on client and server, trust anchoring (crypto
binding). TTLS has the advantage of being able to carry/tunnel a whole load
of sub types (though commonly only around 4 are supported by clients and
On Thu, 20 Sep 2018, 15:27 Hans-Christian Esperer, <hc at hcesperer.org> wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 20, 2018 at 06:43:29AM -0400, Alan DeKok wrote:
> > On Sep 20, 2018, at 2:15 AM, Hans-Christian Esperer <hc at hcesperer.org>
> > > Is there any advantage of TTLS over PEAP security wise?
> > Not a lot. They're both based on EAP-TLS, so they share that security.
> Okay, thank you. I know this is not related to this thread anymore, but
> you elaborate a bit on the "Not a lot"?
> Another question, while we're at it: I just read about WPA3 and realized
> WPA2-PSK does not offer forward secrecy. AFAICT EAP-TLS, TTLS and PEAP *do*
> provide forward secrecy, as long as the TLS handshake establishes a
> session key
> via diffie hellman. Correct?
> Now I wonder whether EAP-PWD, which uses a PSK per user, also provides
> secrecy? My assumption is that it doesn't.
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