AD-integration working well - questions about risk/exposure and related mechanisms
Dag B
dag at bakke.com
Mon Jan 16 19:32:18 UTC 2023
So, after some fiddling, I can now authenticate users of our network
gear (network admins) with AD, via freeradius. Thank you to any and all
who have made that possible. It is truly appreciated.
Arriving here, I just wanted to ask if there is any document discussing
any additional risk or exposure for the AD-accounts by doing this.
Note: I am not trying to imply there is one, nor am I trying to sell
five feathers as whole chicken in a bag or however that analogy goes. I
am merely acknowledging my relative ignorance w.r.t. how AD and RADIUS
works and what security mechanisms it has in place for preventing abuse.
From the top of my head:
- Can someone use freeradius for unlimited tries at guessing an AD password?
- If the radius secret becomes known to a bad actor, could they set up a
'farm' of radius clients in the defined client address spaces to bypass
rate limits?
- And likewise, could they instrument their radius client to reveal more
information than we intend to?
- Is there a better way to define clients than defining static hosts or
networks in clients.conf? (We have an IPAM with an API. Could we employ
this to only permit radius requests from known (expected) radius clients?)
And I am certain there are more questions I should be asking. Conscious
Incompetence and all that jazz....
Thanks,
Dag B
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