Alexander Clouter via Freeradius-Users <freeradius-users@lists.freeradius.org> wrote:
On Thu, 22 Oct 2026, at 15:44, Olivier wrote:
I've got a Freeradius instance on a debian 13 host. It is used as a backend with a (rather old) Unifi WPA2 Entreprise. WiFi rely on PEAP/MSCHAPv2.
Which if I remember, Microsoft is mostly breaking this month with a security update[3].
Partially. There's a registry key to undo the change, and it only affects you if you are using host auths or passing Windows Login screen creds through to the supplicant. If the OS considers your wifi creds to not be the same as the Windows Login creds, you are fine. FWIW the following is a summary I typed up earlier on where things now stand. Comments or corrections are welcome: Yes, we all know EAP-TLS exists. For those that wish to preserve the use of usernames and require a responsible user, rather then trust individual machines not to find their way into the wrong hands, EAP-TTLS-PAP seems to be the only viable multi-OS path forward. PEAP-MSCHAPv2 might stay viable for non-SSO applications for quite some time yet, moreso if your credential store is not in Active Directory, but the writing is on the wall that Microsoft and the rest of the industry intends to make life difficult for anyone trying to use it (also, for anyone using public CAs.) It just seems to bug them to no end that the inner tunnel protocol was "cracked" and as a PR move they intend to replace it with... cleartext. Can't crack that. It would be funny if we weren't the ones cleaning up after them. And of course, despite having years to do so, they have offered no real replacement that satisfies the concerns of those that don't feel confident trusting their RADIUS servers with unpacked plaintext passwords. MPSK/IPSK will not translate to WPA3 the way many might think, barring locking yourself into a vendor-specific hack. So if you are fine with each user having a separate "wifi password" and hoped to have them use it to salt an SAE per-device credential as a portal-less onboarding mehcanism... nope. You'll need a portal based onboarding flow to properly authenticate on first use, sorry. The industry has spoken thus and told you to get bent. EAP-TTLS-PAP comes with some caveats: 1) For Windows to properly TOFU, TLSv1.3 must be turned off. Use TLSv1.2, it supports crypto suites required by WPA3 just fine. Microsoft Windows's session resumption for TLS1.3 is broken anyway, so there's even more reason to turn it off. TLS1.2 will be viable up and until post-quantum initiatives make life difficult again, since the standards bodies have explicitly stated they will not be adding PQ cyphers to TLS1.2. That is a ways off though. 2) You must configure your inner tunnel to detect EAP-GTC inner protocol and map it to PAP for the Apple clients to TOFU to a EAP-TTLS-PAP network. 3) For those storing their creds in an actual Microsoft AD system, you *could* hink things up to use the PAP credentials in many different ways. Don't choose a way that involves NTLM. It will break as soon as Microsoft decides to push server-side changes designed to kill NTLM. They have provided ample (if mealy mouthed) warnings that they intend to do so. You should be looking to rlm_krb5. 4) KRB5 tickets are not designed for the use-once-throw-away mode they are used for in RADIUS. As such, backend server load may become a problem. The more immediate issue, though, is that KRB5 intrinsically lacks the protections against account lockout after a password change (where a device still using an old password locks the user's account.) The rlm_cache module inside FreeRADIUS can restore similar protections as well as reduce the load on KRB5 backend servers. This does involve a larger memory profile for the server as the cache can get pretty big. (I'd share the config we have worked up for this, but seeing as it is untested except for some lab experiments, I'll hold off till we get some mileage on it.) 5) Android users end up getting hit with the most BYOD onboarding friction, since they currently default to EAP-TTLS-MSCHAP when EAP-TTLS is detected. Maybe this will get fixed at some point (...but given the decades of bungling by all parties involved...) Certain phone vendors will absolutely require an app to connect to networks using a private CA, as they lack the "Trust on First Use" option. Not-so-EAP-TTLS-PAP specific things: The use of public CA certificates for server roots will become more and more untenable as CAs tighten renewal intervals on leaf certificates. TOFU behavior has improved, and may be the best choice for low-friction onboarding, and it mostly works for private roots at this point with the notable exception being those abovementioned Android-based phone brands. The main drawback to public CA it is that TOFU supplicants pin to a specific leaf certificate, and so users must re-TOFU on every certificate renewal and it gets users into the bad habit of accepting certificate warnings. As such, proper use of an onboarding tool to set DN validation is still highly advisable when using public CAs (and yes, EAP-TLS folks, you need to do so too, not just install a client cert.) Private CAs can stretch their server cert out to a bit under 2 years. Extend that beyond 2 years, and you will have Apple issues. This longer duration helps prevent TOFU-based users from getting accustomed to approving popups. DN validation could still be used if you find the installation of that worth the effort... it adds barely any security over a root that is just for your server and nothing else; it just makes leaf cert renewals transparent to the user. For the longer duration which the installed intermediate certificate can have over the leaf certificate this might not be worth the technical debt. For MS host (machine) auths, ye shall use EAP-TLS going forward. So sayeth Microsoft and the rest of the maniacs driving this bus seem to agree on this as well. You can offer EAP-TLS as a second protocol option on the same SSID and take the hit on roaming latency, or run another SSID for your managed devices. Pick your poison. Finally, if you find TOFU tasteless and you use .mobileconfig for installing a private CA on Apples, install an intermediate not a root CA. Unless you actually want your Apple users trusting your RADIUS server cert for web browsing security.