Alexander Clouter via Freeradius-Users <freeradius-users@lists.freeradius.org> wrote:
On Thu, 29 Oct 2026, at 17:07, Brian Julin wrote:
But, we are waaayyy over half BYOD clients here, no GPO or Intune. It's less about whether the cert may leave the machine and more about whether the machine may leave the user.
I would be surprised if those users had not set up for their machine to cache/remember their password.
Oh absolutely. Of course, any who actually have good reason to care enough at least have the option not to, which they would not with certs. It's much easier to train our helpdesk/users about locked/expired account passwords than dealing with familiarizing them with the process of renewing/invalidating a particular machine certificate. Passwords eventually expire and users know how to deal with that. With certs you either set up an auto-renewal process, in which case a mis-appropriated machine will never lose access, or you have to hassle your users more often to go through re-onboarding since the password aging and cert lifetimes are not intrinsically syncronized. Actual stolen machines are, yes, a concern but the more common concern is one user helping another get their machine online resulting in the latter running around with the wrong set of privileges. Which is an AUP violation, but happens.
At least with the certificate it only provides them with network access, not then potentially everything (non-MFA'd) else.
True in most cases but just because user+password is used does not mean the user+password is used for something other than network. Had I my druthers, we'd have separate wifi passwords.
Maybe an option for you is to move the lockout from your IdP and into FreeRADIUS and instruct the IdP to not apply lock out (or at a much higher threshold) for authentications through your RADIUS server?
We do want lockouts, and the backend has to be the thing that does it, as it's used for more than serving RADIUS.
We hash the user/pass before storing the cache entry, and rotate the hash seed, which under FR3 is mere theater but once we are in FR4, where objects are wiped when freed, it will greatly reduce the theoretical exposure of retained creds in the AS server.
Not really sure what you mean about "rotating the seed".
We use a single-entry cache to host two seeds, the current and retiring one, and periodically age out the old seed. The cache that tracks whether a username+password tuple is a successful combination or how many times it has recently failed has a hash of the user+password seeded with one of these seeds as its key. If we did not rotate the seed, we'd have a bunch of hashes that could be dictionary attacked offline if swiped along with the seed, sitting in yet-to-be-recycled rbtree slots. With the rotation, we have many less of those, anything old is using a long since forgotten seed. The rest of the caches protect the tuple has from being filled up by (possibly unintentional) DoS as well as other AAA flooding vectors. Imperfectly, but with the realization that anyone who is doing so is, if they are smart, also rotating through usernames and calling-station-ids, so one of them is just a rate limit on called-station-id since they probably can't afford a physically distributed system from which to launch a spraying attack.
Looks like you got Alan's attention though[1] and that is no bad thing :)
LoL.
Memory freed back to the OS is a problem, I think less so if FR still holds onto it.
Agreed. But I nuke things from orbit. It's the only way to be sure :-)