On Thu, 29 Oct 2026, at 17:07, Brian Julin wrote:
But, we are waaayyy over half BYOD clients here, no GPO or Intune. It's less about whether the cert may leave the machine and more about whether the machine may leave the user.
I would be surprised if those users had not set up for their machine to cache/remember their password. At least with the certificate it only provides them with network access, not then potentially everything (non-MFA'd) else.
Our prototype system is dedicated to just user/pass pairs, doesn't combine any authorization stuff. It still lets password guessing of many different passwords through to lock the account, and combined with a few other caches, handles AAA DoS attempts and spraying as much as possible.
Though you may know this already, others might not so here for them to read... If you check the *good* password cache before the bad, you avoid the lockout problem as well as creating a whole bunch of single use caching keys[2], though it assumes the user logged in at least once before it all kicked off. Maybe an option for you is to move the lockout from your IdP and into FreeRADIUS and instruct the IdP to not apply lock out (or at a much higher threshold) for authentications through your RADIUS server?
We hash the user/pass before storing the cache entry, and rotate the hash seed, which under FR3 is mere theater but once we are in FR4, where objects are wiped when freed, it will greatly reduce the theoretical exposure of retained creds in the AS server.
Not really sure what you mean about "rotating the seed". What I do is give each user their own salt and cache the following: &control:Crypt-Password := "%{crypt:$6$%{randstr:32s}:%{User-Password}}"
It's a bit paranoid. Frankly you're pretty boned if someone is in far enough to read FR's memory space or freed segments. But you know, "security in depth", right?
Looks like you got Alan's attention though[1] and that is no bad thing :) Memory freed back to the OS is a problem, I think less so if FR still holds onto it. If you have a bad actor in there, they can just read the credentials in the clear as they pass through or export the TLS keying material. Cheers Alex [1] https://github.com/FreeRADIUS/freeradius-server/commit/f3b8d2a67a54d9bec5551... [2] ideally fronting the cache insertion with a Bloomfilter so you only insert on the *second* hit to prevent this but you would need to either use Redis as your backend (which has support for sketches) or call out to Perl or (eugh) Python for that; the latter will not work as well for distributed caches but better than nothing.